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Abstract
The International market of crude oil and natural gas is well
established and very competitive. Knowledge about costs is
important in helping to understand the current position of
producers within the industry. In the eyes of the producers,
the lower the costs the more profitable they will become
given the price of crude.
This thesis focuses on an economic analysis of crude oil
exploration in Saskatchewan and Alberta. In a competitive
market, the producers require estimates of finding costs in
both regions. The public policies that are designed to
encourage crude exploration also rely heavily on reliable
estimates of these costs.
The results show that Saskatchewan’s per-unit finding cost
is significantly lower than Alberta’s in spite of the
geological differences between the two provinces. The finding
costs are estimated by using a methodology (Uhler 1979) that
has been widely accepted within economic literature of non-
renewable resources. The results support the hypothesis that
finding costs in both regions are increasing and the argument
that these costs will converge in the long-run, except for
the last six years of the analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The international market of crude oil is well established and
very competitive. 1 Large numbers of producers compete to
satisfy an enormous demand, 2 implying that the price is
determined in the world oil market. In the eyes of producers,
the lower the operating costs the more profitable they will
become, given the price of crude. Therefore, knowledge about
costs is important in helping to understand the current
position of the producers. 3
Canada is part of the international market even though Canada
is a small oil producer in the world. The daily crude
production in Canada is only 305 thousand cubic meters out
of daily 10468 thousands cubic meters world crude production
4Energy Statistic Handbook, Statistic Canada, Natural Resources Canada, CD Rom - May 2001,
and CANSIM Catalogue Files  <http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/cansim/catalogues.html>,
matrix number E8600 and E8616.
5
Ibid.
6
Source: Statistic Canada, catalogue 26-213-XPB,1999.
2
during 1999; 4 smaller than 3% of the total world production.
The established reserves in Canada during that year are even
less significant at 769 billion cubic meters of total 165,830
billion cubic meters world oil reserves. 5 This is less than
0.5% of the world reserves.
Saskatchewan and Alberta are the main oil producing provinces
in Canada with approximately 28% and 58% of the total
national production. 6 The main market for oil produced in
both provinces is the North American market (Canada and USA).
However, the global market connections exist through an
elaborate system of pipelines and through railway or ocean
shipping (tankers). These linkages connect both regions to
the international oil market and the industry.
The process of supplying oil is complex, and involves several
steps, each of which is costly and time consuming. The
economic analysis of supply process suggests that the major
steps are:
7Fisher (1964), Epple (1975), Eglington (1975), Pindyck (1978), Uhler (1976, 1979),
Devarajan and Fisher (1982), Eglington and Uffelman (1983), Bradley (1984), Scarfe and
Rilkoff (1984), Livernois and Ryan (1987), Livernois (1988).
3
1. Exploration(finding) activities
2. Development activities
3. Production activities
4. Transportation activities
Each of these steps involves costs. The cost of exploration,
or finding cost, is the cost of finding new oil. This is
important because it provides crucial information for
investment decisions. Many studies in petroleum economics
conclude that exploration cost is a significant cost of the
total cost (development cost, transportation cost, production
cost, etcetera) in the industry. 7 Of those, most expenses
tend to be allocated on the first two steps, exploration
(finding) and development activities. The scope of this study
will only be the exploration activities.
One peculiar problem faced by every producer is the scarcity
problem. It will be increasingly difficult to find ’new oil’
in the future. ’Difficult’ means delays in exploration
activities, and a delay can be very costly. ’Difficult’ can
also mean more efforts required to drill. The deeper a pool
to be drilled, the costlier a project will be. Both will
cause an oil company to dig into its purse even deeper.
8Mossop G.D., Geological Survey of Canada, Calgary, <http://www.ags.gov.ab.ca/ags_pub>.
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Therefore a ’difficult’ exploration will tend to drive costs
upward and can be portrayed as an increasing cost curve in
Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Expected finding cost
In the literature of Petroleum Economics this curve is
frequently called the Supply Curve of Discovery. It is the
locus of the short-run marginal cost of each new discovery.
There are significant differences in geophysical and
geological structures between the two provinces. Geological
studies suggest that the crude accumulations in the tectonic
elements in Saskatchewan are smaller than they are in
Alberta, 8 implying a smaller amount of oil in place
estimates. Less oil in place implies lower reserves. The
9Porter, R. and K. Hendricks, “Determinants of the Timing and Incidence of Exploratory
Drilling on Offshore Wildcat Tracts”, American Economic Review, vol. 86, 1996, P. 388-407.
5
reserves in both provinces are dispersed within the Western
Sediment Basin. The basin captures large area of Alberta and
only the south part of Saskatchewan. 
The total land areas of the two provinces are approximately
the same. These totals are divided into the tracts for
exploration purposes. Since the Western sediment basin
captures a smaller land area of Saskatchewan than Alberta,
it is not surprising that there are fewer discoveries and
successful tracts in Saskatchewan compared with Alberta.
Porter and Hendricks, for example, suggest that there is very
high probability of finding new significant oil fields in the
neighbouring tracts of those which have been previously
successful. 9 In other words, the study suggests that one
would expect a lower chance to find ’new oil field’ that is
economically significant in Saskatchewan relative to Alberta.
Public policies will also affect the economic incentives
through costs. For the sake of economic analysis in the two
producing regions, the impact of public policies on costs
will be compared and examined as well. Suppose the public
policies in Saskatchewan and Alberta do not differ
significantly. With fewer expected new discoveries in
Saskatchewan, oil producers will generally expect exploration
6activities in Saskatchewan to be less successful than
exploration activities in Alberta.
Finding cost (FC) is defined as the cost of finding one cubic
meter of new oil. Given the total cost of exploration, the
expected finding cost will depend entirely on the expected
discoveries. The expected new oil discovery in Saskatchewan
is lower than it is in Alberta, therefore the short-run
(current) Saskatchewan’s finding cost is expected to be
higher vis-à-vis Alberta’s. Accordingly, the producers’
expectations of finding costs in Saskatchewan and Alberta can
be described in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Producers’ finding cost expectations in two
producing regions
10
Even though it is more likely that the most promising area is the area where most
discoveries being made, the quote that the area is the most economically profitable is
misleading because of the expenditure of extracting final products in that area can be more
costly at the margin (per-cubic meter).
7
Economic theory suggests that all producers are profit
maximizers. The producers are assumed to be aware of economic
incentives from exploration. They will choose the most
promising area that is expected to contain a significant
amount of oil and gas reservoirs, and that is economically
profitable. 10 Saskatchewan and Alberta are neighboring
provinces within a national border. Inputs are expected to
be mobile, except for the land input. Economic theory
suggests that firms (producers) operating in competitive
input markets will act quickly to exploit profitable
opportunities. When the producers realize that finding cost
in one region is lower than the other, they will be expected
to move their exploration activities to the lowest cost
region. More activities in that region will normally cause
the finding costs to increase. Ultimately, the finding costs
in that region will increase at an increasing (higher) rate
compared with the higher cost region. Once the expected FC
reaches $ X per-cubic meter, at which the expected FC for
both provinces are equal, finding activities will also occur
in Saskatchewan. In aggregate, the expected FC for both
provinces is illustrated as bold curve in Figure 1.2.
11
Hotteling (1931), Hubbert (1962), Fisher (1964), Adelman (1972, 1990), Pindyck (1978),
Uhler (1976, 1979), Devarajan and Fisher (1982), Livernois (1988).
12
Hotteling (1931), Hubbert (1962), Fisher (1964), Adelman (1972, 1990), Uhler (1976, 1979),
Devarajan and Fisher (1982), Livernois (1988).
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The hypotheses in this thesis is then the following:
1. Unit finding costs in both provinces are expected to
increase 11 due to resource scarcity problems. 12
2. In each region, finding cost will increase at different
rates due to the differences in geological structures,
land areas, public policies, finding expectations,
etcetera.
3. Saskatchewan’s per-unit finding cost is expected to be
higher than Alberta’s because the quantity of oil
discoveries in Saskatchewan is expected to be lesser
than in Alberta.
4. However, the profit-maximizing behaviour of the
producers suggests that finding costs in both regions
will converge in the long-run.
Uhler’s methodology will be used to estimate the finding
costs in both regions. Once the empirical results are
estimated, they will be compared and analyzed to see whether
or not they behave as expected in the two regions. 
Chapter 2 begins with the background of crude oil and natural
gas in Saskatchewan and Alberta. In Chapter 3, the
9discussions are on the review of literature. Chapter 4
presents estimations and empirical results. The methodology
of estimation is based on Uhler’s 1979 model, modified with
references to Eglington 1975, Eglington and Uffelmann 1983,
and Livernois 1987. The causes of finding cost differences
between the two regions are discussed in Chapter 5.
Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6.
10
Chapter 2
The Background of Crude Oil in Saskatchewan and
Alberta
2.1 Crude Oil Discoveries
Saskatchewan's first commercial crude oil production occurred
in 1944 in Lloydminster. The discovery of the Midale oil
field in the southeast in 1953 was a big step toward modern
crude oil exploration in Saskatchewan. Intensive exploration
efforts in the mid 1950s and early 1960s led to the
discoveries of many major pools in the province. The Crown
holds approximately 75% of oil and gas rights in
Saskatchewan, and these rights are leased to private
companies for development and production. The remaining 25%
of the oil and gas rights are privately owned and generally
available for leasing. Oil and gas are produced from
reservoir rocks ranging in age from Ordovician to Cretaceous.
As presented in Table 2.1, before 1953 there were less than
500 wells drilled in Saskatchewan, compared with 6,016 active
wells in 1969. In 1979 there were 8,071 active wells and
9,588 wells capable of production. Total production of crude
13
Source: Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Mineral Statistics Yearbook, 1999, P. 219-220.
14
Source: ibid.
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was less than five hundred thousand cubic meters (M³) in
1953. It increased to 13.89 million M³ in 1969, but decreased
to 9.37 million M³ in 1979.
Table 2.1: Oil wells and yearly production in Saskatchewan,
selected years 13
Year Active
Wells
Wells Capable of
Production
Crude Production
(000 M³)
Average Prod./Well
(000 M³)
1953 454 760 444 0.98
1969 6,016 7,096 13,891 2.31
1979 8,071 9,588 9,372 1.16
1989 13,880 18,982 11,696 0.84
1997 18,856 27,013 23,460 1.24
Figure 2.1: Wells drilled in Saskatchewan, 1961-1998 14
12
Alberta’s first natural gas discovery was made in Langevin,
near Medicine Hat in 1883. In 1902, crude oil was produced
for the first time at the Waterton Lake National Park. Later
seven wells were drilled around Medicine Hat. Activities
moved to Bow Island in 1909. In 1914, the oil and gas
industry ’fever’ in Calgary caused the stocks in oil and gas
exploration industry to surge. It came to an end in 1917 when
many exploration companies declared bankruptcy. Another
significant discovery was made in Turner Valley in 1924 by
the Calgary Petroleum Products Company. Exploration
activities kept flourishing until 1936 in this area.
In 1947, a major discovery of light oil in Leduc, south of
Edmonton, by Imperial Oil placed Alberta nationally and
internationally on the map as a major crude and gas producing
region. The huge discoveries continued after 1947 in Pembina,
Gillwood, and Rainbow-Zama, and have made up a great oil and
gas cumulative discoveries in Alberta. 
Table 2.2 presents the growth of drilling activities
conducted in Alberta, and Figure 2.2 shows the historical
exploration activities and development activities in that
province.
15
Sources:
(1)ERCB Annual Statistic, 1985, p. 61.
(2)ERCB Annual report, <http://energy.gov.ab.ca/bbs/news/newsreel/1999/nr99-11.htm>.
(3)Crude Oil and Gas Disposition, Statistic Canada, 26-213-XPB, 1999, p. 2.
16
Sources: ibid.
13
Table 2.2: Oil wells and yearly production in Alberta,
selected years 15
Year Active
wells
Wells Capable of
Production
Crude Production 
(000 M³)
Average Prod./Well 
(000 M³)
1953 1,361 4,454 12,190 8.96
1969 1,950 14,000 39,850 20.44
1979 5,780 17,673 68,483 11.85
1989 n/a n/a 73,979 n/a
1997 39,493 89,640 55,491 1.40
Note: Tar sands are excluded
Figure 2.2: Wells drilled in Alberta, 1961-1998 16
14
A comparison of the aggregate activities between the two
provinces is possible with reference to Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
In 1979, around 84% of oil wells capable of production were
active in Saskatchewan, but only around 33% for Alberta. The
average production per well, however, was much larger in
Alberta. Intuitively speaking, even though capable, the in-
active wells indicate that these wells must be operated
uneconomically. Ordinarily, should the wells contain enough
oil to generate profits they would have been activated. In
other words, the costs to operate these wells must be higher
than the total value of outputs in order for them to be left
abandoned. Assuming each well requires equal cost of
exploration, a smaller proportion of active wells also
implies a costlier process, therefore the oil wells in
Saskatchewan must be operated more economically efficient
compare with the oil wells in Alberta (Chapter 4).
2.2 Crude Oil Reserves
There are many definitions of reserves in the oil industry.
Oil in place is an estimate of the volume of crude in the
ground. Part of this estimate is recoverable, but some is
not. The recoverable crude in the ground is called initial
recoverable reserves. Some of these reserves have already
been established, and that called initial established
reserves. The remaining reserves are then calculated by
subtracting the initial established reserves from yearly
17
See: Uhler (1979), Bradley(1984).
18
For example: economic reason, political reason, etc.
15
production plus reserve additions during that year.
Reserve additions come from several sources: 17 discoveries
of new reservoirs; development of old reservoirs;
reproduction and extension of known reservoirs; 18 and
adjustment and revision of the in-ground values of  those
known reservoirs.
Historical data shows that yearly estimates of remaining
reserves of crude for both provinces from 1971 to 1999 are
fairly stable. Whether the yearly estimates of remaining
reserves raise or fall will depend on the rates of reserve
additions and productions. When the rate of production grows
faster than the rate of reserve additions during one
particular year, the remaining reserves fall.
Alberta reserve additions peaked during the 1960s. This peak
was a result of the cumulative discoveries of large basins
in Alberta, such as Leduc (1947), and immediately followed
by discoveries of other plays: Pembina, Swan-Hills, Gillwood,
and Rainbow-Zama. These discoveries caused the cumulative oil
and gas reserves in Alberta to increase rapidly. They also
attracted more producers to try their luck in Alberta.
19
Saskatchewan data is taken from Reservoir Annual - Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, and
Alberta data is taken from ERCB Reserves. Reserves addition is approximated by subtracting
total yearly production to the change in remaining reserves during particular year.
20
Tanner, J.N., “An Evaluation of Crude Oil Supply In Saskatchewan,” Study no.25, Canadian
Energy Research Institute, 1987, p.51.
21
Source: Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Reservoir Annual, 1971-1999, p. C-1.
16
Figure 2.3 shows that reserve additions in Saskatchewan are
mainly from development and extension of old reservoirs. 19
Tanner believes that at least 80% of all oil in the ground
had already been discovered in Saskatchewan. 20 While Figure
2.4 shows that Alberta’s reserve additions from new
discoveries were fairly stable, relative to its reserve
additions from an extension of old reservoirs.
Figure 2.3: Reserve additions - Saskatchewan, 1971-1998 21
22
Source : ERCB Reserves, 1985, Table 8-1, p. 8-2.
23
As noted by Professor Adelman (1972), there are three kind of prices in economic
theory:1)The Market Price; The current rate of exchange of money against goods, 2) The
Competitive Supply Price; The least that need to be paid to bring forth the stream of
output, and 3)The Reference Price; The expected revenues that will exceed or at least equal
the competitive supply price (The World Petroleum Market, P.195-196).
17
Figure 2.4: Reserve additions - Alberta, 1951-1985 22
2.3 Crude Oil Prices 23
The market price of crude will determine the economic
incentives from exploration. The higher the price the higher
is the in-ground value of crude. A high in-ground value of
crude implies greater incentives to find new oil. Assuming
that producers are profit maximizers, they will conduct more
explorations. In this thesis, the average cost of imported
crude into Montreal will be used as a benchmark market price
18
for international crude. This price is similar to the price
in the international market, the US-refiner acquisition price
of imported crude from Canada and elsewhere. In Saskatchewan
and Alberta, the average wellhead price will be used as the
Canadian market price. Because of the National Energy Program
(NEP) introduced in the 1970s, the Canadian market price was
set below the international market price (see Figure 2.5).
Professor Adelman suggests the competitive supply price
consists of the costs of supplying oil. There are many
categories of costs involved in the process of supplying oil
(Chapter 1). This price also determines the producers’
profits. A lower supply price will yield a higher profits to
the producers. Since finding costs are included in the
competitive supply price it is  important to include this
price in an economic analysis.
Professor Adelman also introduces the concept of reference
price. It is a measure of the expected revenues that must
exceed or be equal to the supply price. The reference price,
then, should fall somewhere between the competitive supply
price and the market price. When the reference price is
lesser than the supply price, no producer would like to
supply crude oil.
24
Sources:
1. Government of United States website: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/crhon.html>.
2.CANSIM catalogue files, <http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/cansim/catalogues.html>.
Label: E313018.
3. ERCB Annual Statistic, 1985, p. 8 and 9.
4. Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Mineral Statistics Yearbook, 1999, p. 75.
19
Figure 2.5: International crude oil prices 24
25
Sources:
(1)ERCB Annual Statistic, 1985, p. 8 and 9.
(2)Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Mineral Statistics Yearbook, 1999, p. 75.
20
2.3.1 Historical Background of Crude Price: The Three Eras
The trends for oil prices in both provinces follow world
events closely. As presented in Figure 2.6 (as well as in
Figure 2.5), the historical data suggest that the price
behaviour can basically be divided into three eras; the
stable price era(1945-1972), the rising price era(1973-1985),
and the volatile price era(1986-present).
Figure 2.6: World events and oil wellhead prices in
Saskatchewan (1961-1998) and Alberta (1961-1985) 25
21
Stable Oil Prices: 1945-1972
After the World War, the crude wellhead prices were fairly
stable at about CAD 15/M³ from 1950s to the end of 1971. The
price started to increase in 1972, declined slightly at the
end of the year, and rose consistently until the end of 1985.
Rising Oil Prices: 1973-1985
An increasing price started when Yom Kippur War and Arab Oil
Embargo began. The war was started shortly after Syria and
Egypt attacked Israel on October 5, 1973. The result was a
significant change of crude price in the world. The crude
wellhead prices in Saskatchewan and Alberta were CAD 20.28/M³
and CAD 17.99/M³ respectively in 1972, and rose to
approximately CAD 40/M³ shortly after the war.
Another war, the Iraq-Iran War has led to another enormous
increase in world crude price between 1979 and 1983. The
combination of the Iranian revolution in 1978 and the sharp
loss of crude production in Iraq in 1980 had resulted in more
than doubling of crude price in both provinces in 1983.
Beside the warfare, collusion is another reason of rising
price in the 1980s. As the biggest oil cartel in the world,
OPEC clearly has some control over world oil price. In an
attempt to increase the degree of monopoly, its members set
a tacit production quotas in 1982. The objective of this
22
policy was to stabilize the high crude price. Unfortunately
this attempt was not successful because some of the members
violated the tacit collusion by producing oil beyond their
quotas. Crude productions in non-OPEC countries also rose,
for example: in United States, Canada, Norway, Russia, China,
United Kingdom and Mexico.
Saudi Arabia has played a dominant role in OPEC. Saudi Arabia
led OPEC countries to stop the crude price from falling by
cutting its production in 1984. It finally gave up in 1985
because the loss of its petroleum share over national income
was too large. The price started to decline, and has
fluctuated since.
Volatile Oil Prices: 1986-present
By the early 1986, the Saudis increased their production by
around 144% from roughly two million barrels to approximately
4.9 million barrels per day. This led to sharp decreases in
world crude prices. However, the combination of warfare in
the Middle east and OPEC policies caused a ’roller-coaster’
in crude price in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Another
event is the end of Iraq-Iran War. This stimulated more
production in the Middle East and led to another sharp
decrease in crude price to roughly CAD 80/M³ in 1988. When
Iraq invaded Kuwait there was another jump in crude prices
in 1990. Prices decreased when Iraq was defeated.
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Refer to ‘Crude Oil Market Alert’, Canadian energy experts (Vincent Lauerman - CERI, Andrew
Thompson - Saskatchewan Minister of Energy, Patricia Nelson - Finance Minister, Government
of Alberta) predicted large drop in crude oil price in the local market, Alberta and
Saskatchewan ..... Finance Minister said making spending decisions for 2002 will be more
difficult, The StarPhoenix, November 1st 2001, p. C1 and C5.
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Crude prices were stable from 1991 to 1994. In 1995, the
booming economy in Asia and the strong economy in USA
increased the demand for crude and led to higher crude price.
But markets are subject to risks. Emerging financial market
crises in Asia happened at the same time when OPEC increased
its production quotas by 10%. This combination led to a
decrease in crude prices in 1998. 
The Asian market recovery and a strong American economy in
1999 again led to high demand for crude oil and record high
crude price at CAD 203/M³. The recent September 11th incident
led to another significant fall of the crude price in both
provinces. 26
In summary, prices in the local market follow the crude price
in world markets. As noted in chapter 1, under current
competition condition the local market is connected to the
national and the international markets. The connection among
these markets clearly depend on the ease of transportation
of crude. The degree of ’openness’, however, not only depends
on the connection to the world markets, but also depends on
the regulations by authorities.
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2.3.2 Prices and Transportation of Crude
There are several ways of transporting crude from one region
to another: ocean shipping, barges, railways, or pipelines.
This will enable oil producers to place crude in the local
or the international market. Crude transportation also
requires costs.
Transportation costs vary depending on the situation and
condition of placing crude into a market. When supplies are
plentiful, most of these costs are borne by producers. They
will sell oil at low profits or even at short-term loss. When
demand is strong most of these costs are borne by consumers.
The profit maximizing producers will choose the most
efficient combinations of transportation. To maximize profits
one must minimize costs. The least cost process is always
preferred, regardless of demand conditions. If the desired
market can be reached by pipelines, then this route will be
chosen because it will yield cheaper cost of transportation
in the long-run.
In the 1950s, crude supply from western Canadian producers
increased quickly. The quantity of crude oil produced
exceeded demand in the regional market. In order to sustain
the expansion, an easy access to a larger market was
required. The larger market was deemed to be the North
27
Source: Statistic Canada, “Supply and Disposition of Crude Oil,” catalogue 26-213-XPB,1951-
1999.
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American market (Canada and USA). The largest markets were
located in/around Chicago and Ontario. Crude oil from Western
Canada could be transported by pipelines to most of consumers
in the North American market.
Canadian government initiated action in the late 1950s by
building pipelines that would connect the producers in
Saskatchewan and Alberta to central North America. The debate
over petroleum pipelines during the 1950s and the early 1960s
was whether to build an open market to ’all Canadian routes’
(pipelines from Western Canada to Ontario-west of the Ottawa
Valley) or to built the ’routes to the South’ (pipelines
toward Midwest industrial area-Chicago market, in the USA).
The access to the larger market exposed regional producers
to price competition from imported crude. In the early 1960s
the Canadian government protected Western Canadian producers
by reserving Canadian markets to the west of the Ottawa
Valley for domestic producers. The consequence of this policy
was to exclude foreign crude products from the Ontario market
and reserving it for Saskatchewan and Alberta producers. This
policy benefitted the domestic producers in the mid 1960s,
and the crude oil productions in both provinces increased
rapidly. From 1961 to 1969, crude productions in Saskatchewan
and Alberta increased by around 57% and 91% respectively. 27
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Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Canada Year Book 1985, Catalogue No. 11-402E/1985,
The Bryant Press Limited, Ottawa, 1985, p. 367.
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2.4 Public Policies
Both federal and provincial governments can intervene in the
oil industry in many ways. The oil industry in Canada has
experienced three most prominent roles of the government
through its policies, namely, the crude oil price control
during the 1980s, the government control through the access
to reserves, and the control through royalties or production
taxes. All have significantly affected the crude explorations
in Saskatchewan and Alberta. The subsections below will
discuss these public policies and how they may affect the
crude oil exploration in both regions.
2.4.1 The Price Control
The crude prices are closely related to the national economy.
Following the first round of OPEC oil price increases in
1973, the crude prices in all international markets
increased, including in Canada and the United States. In 1974
and 1975, the inflation rate in Canada increased by 10% and
7% respectively. 28 In 1975, there was an attempt to control
the wages and prices by issuing the Anti Inflation Act. In
addition, the Canadian government set the price of crude
produced in Canada below the international price of crude.
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In 1982, a new Federal-Provincial Oil Pricing Agreement was
made. This agreement attempted to encourage domestic crude
exploration by allowing producers who find ’new oil’ to sell
the product at CAD 278/M³. This was above the international
market price. The cost of importing crude into Montreal was
CAD 201/M³. The price of ’old oil’ (produced from wells
completed before 1981) was set at CAD 162/M³. The difference
between the two reference prices was thus then CAD 116/M³.
This left strong incentives to the producers in Alberta and
Saskatchewan to conduct more crude oil exploration
activities. This created ’exploration frenzies’, and
therefore the aggregate expenditures in both regions,
especially in Alberta.
2.4.2 Controlling Access To Reserves
The provincial governments’ involvement in oil exploration
is also by regulating access to reserves and by setting
royalty rates on production from new discoveries. Governments
argue that the objective of these interventions is to
encourage more exploration activities, though is often
extended to other objectives such as economic stability, rate
of employment, labor income distributions, and oil supply.
But before analyzing a specific issue of public policies it
will be helpful to understand the process of oil finding that
underlies these policies.
28
The finding process of reserves involve the usual inputs;
labour and capital. The recruitment process of labour starts
from the hiring of land surveyors; geologists and
geophysicists, to the hiring of field workers; derrick men,
roughnecks, equipment’s operators, field supervisors, and
petroleum engineers. A more complex structure of labour in
the industry also includes overhead workers, office helpers,
sales persons, managers, directors, consultants, and
economists. The acquisition of capital starts from the
purchasing of licences or rights, equipments, buildings to
the bidding of lands or tracts. For the sake of simplicity,
this complex structure is usually divided into three main
categories of inputs; geophysical activity, drilling
activity, and land acquisition.
In Canada, the oil and gas industry is influenced by both
federal and provincial governments. Each government regulates
inputs in different ways. To understand the governments
involvement in the industry it will be useful to discuss how
these regulations originated.
Government Policies on Drilling and Geophysical Inputs
Drilling and geophysic inputs both involve both labour and
capital, but mostly labour. While each province can set their
minimum wage for labour, The British North America Act does
not restrict the mobility of labour and equipment located in
29
Smith, A., “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, New York:
Modern Library, 1937.
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the province.
It is also quite impossible for the Crown to make out-of-
province workers pay more income tax than the workers from
the province origin. In this case then, the two inputs will
be very mobile, and the input markets will somehow achieve
their equilibrium level by Adam Smith’s invisible hand. 29
For example: if roughnecks’ salaries in Saskatchewan are
below the salaries paid to those in Alberta, then more
productive roughnecks will work for oil companies in Alberta.
Government Policies on Land Input
The case for land input is different from the other two
inputs. Land is immobile and is completely dominated by the
provincial government. The British North America Act clearly
states that all non-renewable resources will be controlled
exclusively by each province. Almost the entire land input
consists of capital investments. Even though overhead
expenditures exist, the amount is relatively small compared
with the total investment on land. Overhead costs can
therefore be ignored. The land input is therefore assumed to
consist of the Crown rights sales for oil drilling purposes
only.
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As mentioned by Professor Thaler, an anomaly in oil industry is that the winner of an
auction is often a loser, in a sense that no one know exactly how much oil is in the
ground. See Thaler, R.H, “The Winner’s Curse”, The Free Press, Macmillan, New York, 1992.
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There are two types of land tenure systems for the purpose
of oil and gas exploration and production: the crown and the
freehold exempt. The crown exempt category is mandated by the
Crown Mineral Act while the freehold exempt category by the
Freehold Oil and Gas Production Tax Act. The land rights sale
system is done by auction. The forms of these land sales are:
Special Agreements, Special Exploratory Permits, Exploration
Licences, Permits, Leases, and Drilling Reservations.
In Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Crowns conduct land auctions
six times or more a year. The standard rules of public
auction apply to this process and formally follow The Crown
Mineral Act and The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulation
(1969). The Crown will start ’the bottom-rock’ price based
on the information released during the auction. The bidders
of these rights are the oil producers and the winner 30 of an
auction is of course the one who bids the highest. The more
reliable the information on a specific land the more precise
the investment made by the producers in terms of risk and
return. The final price of the land will then be determined
and the right is sold. At the end of the day, the Crowns will
earn revenues.
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Sources:
(1)Saskatchewan energy and mines, Mineral Statistics Yearbook, 1998, p. 187.
(2)Alberta Bureau of Statistics, Alberta Statistical Review Annual, 1973, p. 66.
(3)Energy Alberta, Annual Report, <http://www.energy.gov.ab/com/time/PNG+sales/public+sales
/public+sales/total+-+1999.htm>.
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Table 2.3 presents information on the area leased and the
revenues collected from land auctions in both provinces. Land
acquisition activities peaked in the late 1960s and the early
1970s, just when the price of crude oil in the world markets
started to increase. Fewer auctions were conducted in
Saskatchewan and more land acquisitions took place in
Alberta. As a result, Alberta’s land price per hectare is
always valued more than Saskatchewan’s (by around $50 per-
hectare, on average, in the 1980s and the 1990s). More
explorations were conducted in Alberta suggests that the
producers believe that there is more oil trapped in the
sedimentary rocks in Alberta. In other words, the producers
would expect a better returns by conducting crude oil
explorations in Alberta, compared with Saskatchewan.
Table 2.3: Area leased and revenues collected from land
auctions in Saskatchewan and Alberta, selected years 31
year Saskatchewan (1) Alberta (2)&(3)
Area
(000.Ha)*
Revenue
($.mil)
Revenue/Ha
(approx.)
Area
(000.Ha)*
Revenue
($.mil)
Revenue/Ha
(approx.)
1953 189 2.7 14.3 n/a n/a n/a
1969 1903 4.9 2.6 29021 163.4 5.6
1980 228 77.6 340.3 2474 1004.9 406.2
1997 934 131.0 140.3 4784 970.0 202.8
Note: * including PNG rights sales of drilling reservations, permits, and leases.
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As states in The Constitution Act (The British North America Act), 1867, Non-Renewable
Natural Resources, Forestry Resources and Electrical Energy : ...92A. (1) In each province,
the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to (a) exploration for non-renewable
natural resources in the province;...4) In each province, the legislature may make laws in
relation to the raising of money by any mode or system of taxation in respect of  (a)
non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and the primary
production therefrom.
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Source: Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Mineral Statistic Yearbook 1999: p. 11 and 74.
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2.4.3 Royalties and Taxes
The Crowns own the crude oil and natural gas in the ground.
They decide whether to produce crude oil and gas through
their own corporation, or to sell rights to the private
producers. The relation between the Crowns and the producers
are best described as principal-agent relation. 32 The Crowns
collect revenues from royalties and taxes paid by the
producers. Both provincial governments’ revenues from
royalties and production taxes are presented in Table 2.4 and
Table 2.5.
Table 2.4: Saskatchewan provincial revenues from oil royalty
and production taxes, all types of crude, 1980-1985 33
Year Revenue from Oil
Royalty (Mil.$)
Value of Oil
Production (Mil.$)
Percentage Revenues of the
Value of Production (%) **
1980 386 860 44.9
1981 334 818 40.8
1982 388* 1186 32.7
1983 513* 1646 31.2
1984 518* 1863 27.8
1985 547* 2241 24.4
Notes:
* Excluding oil exports tax of 349.08 millions for 1982, 54,95 millions for 1983, 85,35
millions for 1984, and 66.14 millions for 1985.
** Net After rebates
34
Source: Alberta Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, Annual Report 1985, p. 6.
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Table 2.5: Alberta provincial revenues from oil royalties and
production taxes, all types of crude, 1980-1985 34
Year Revenue from Oil
Royalty (Mil.$)
Value of Oil
Production (Mil.$)
Percentage Revenues of the
Value of Production (%) **
1980 1970 6919 28.5
1981 2180 7504 29.1
1982 2339 9264 25.3
1983 2883 10826 26.6
1984 3100 11661 26.6
1985 2700 12209 22.1
Note: ** Net After rebates
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the aggregate amount of oil
royalties collected by the Crowns as a percentage of the
values of production. The tables indicate that Saskatchewan’s
royalty rates are consistently higher than Alberta’s rates
during the 1980s. The difference of the revenues collected
as a percentage of the value of production in Saskatchewan
and Alberta ranges between 2% to 16%. From 1982 to 1985, the
recorded data for Saskatchewan includes the federal oil
export tax. In the table itself the oil export tax is
excluded since this tax is charged by the federal government,
not the Crowns.
The question why these royalties differ is not explored. The
level of royalty and tax rates are determined by the
governments. As the price of crude in the world market
35
Source: Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Annual Report, (1982/1983: p. 11), (1983/1984: p.
11-12), (1984/1985: p. 11-12), (1985/1986: p. 9-10 ). It is clearly stated: “... the Branch
involves in the development of a new royalty and taxation system for the oil industry,..”
36
Source: Alberta Energy, Annual Report, (1986: p. 11-21).
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change, the producers’ incentives from producing oil will
change. As the incentives from producing oil change, the
level of activities will also change, depending on the new
level (higher or lower) of the world crude price. The Crown
normally takes this opportunity by charging the producers
higher or lower royalty rates accordingly, and receive some
optimum revenues. To support this argument, let us examine
more closely on how the royalties and production taxes are
determined.
There is a branch of the Crowns energy division that will
take an active role in discussion with oil industry and the
federal government on taxation and other matters affecting
the economic performance of the industry. In Saskatchewan,
the Energy Division of the Saskatchewan Energy and Mines 35
recommends the level of royalty rates levied on the producers
during the year. In Alberta, the Policy Analysis and Planning
Division in co-operation with other divisions and agencies
of the Alberta Energy Conservation Board will perform this
task. 36
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Sources:
(1)Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Annual Report, 1985/1986, p. 37.
(2)"The Oil Well Income Tax Regulations 1983," Saskatchewan Gazette,v79,1983, p. 16-17.
(3)"The Oil Well Income Tax Regulations 1981," Saskatchewan Gazette,v77,1981, p. 154.
(4)"Important Events of 1985", Alberta Energy, Annual Report, 1985, p. 6.
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Table 2.6: The range of oil royalty rates in Saskatchewan and
Alberta, 1981-1985 37
Year Saskatchewan (1),(2)&(3) Alberta (4)
New Oil(%) Old Oil(%) New Oil(%) Old Oil(%)
81/82 0-39.62 0-56.6 n/a n/a
83/84 0-43.07(non-heavy)
0-38.76(heavy)
0-50.6(non-heavy)
0-45.5(heavy)
0-35 0-45
85/86 0-40(non-heavy)
0-32(heavy)
0-57(non-heavy)
0-45(heavy)
0-30 0-40
Table 2.6 presents the range of royalty rates in both
provinces. The royalty and tax rates increase as the quantity
of production increases. For example: no royalties will be
charged to the producers whose monthly productions are less
than 10 M³ per-well. On the contrary, maximum royalty rates
will be changed (i,e: 40% for Saskatchewan’s new oil-medium
light and 30% for Alberta’s) to the producers whose monthly
productions exceed 150 M³ per well.
How will the royalties and taxes affect the firms? Royalties
and taxes will affect the producers’ returns directly, since
the change in royalties and taxes rates will change the net
returns from the production of crude. The change in royalty
rate will result in the change in the net back price, and
thus the value of oil in place. Any change will lead to
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For Example: Paus-Jenssen A., “Resource Taxation and the Supreme Court of Canada: The Cigol
Case”, Canadian Public Policy, vol.5, no.1, 1979, p. 45-58. 
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For example: W.B. Friedenberg, Z.C.Slagorsky, and A.J. Walsh  in “Government Incentives In
Canada’s Petroleum Industry,” Canadian Energy Research Institute, Calgary, 1980.
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changes in economic incentives for the producers.
The change in incentives will change future profit
expectations, and thus the level of exploration activities
and finding costs. Another indirect effect is the competing
tax claims by the divisions of tax revenue of the federal and
the provincial governments. Revenues collected from royalties
and taxes often create conflicts between provincial and
federal governments.38 Conflicts tend to affect drilling
activities and discovery rates because it will cause the
exploration activities to be delayed. As introduced in
chapter one, the longer it takes to complete a project, the
costlier the project will be (the higher the costs).
By regulating royalties and taxes, the Crowns are expected
to encourage exploration activities in the oil industry. If
the royalty and tax for ’new oil’ are lower than the royalty
and tax for ’old oil’, more efforts on explorations are
expected. The government regulations and the costs within the
industry can therefore have a causal-effect relationship,
such that when the costs are high, it is necessary to reduce
taxes to stabilize the prices, or vice-versa. 39
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2.5 Summary
This chapter has described the background of oil industry in
Saskatchewan and Alberta. The discussion of the complex
structure of costs and production is unavoidable because the
industry has been continuously developed for many decades in
Saskatchewan, and for more than a century in Alberta. Both
are well established. This discussion is important in order
to provide an accurate analysis.
When a producer enters the oil industry, the first activity
is to find oil through the discovery process. This process
requires three inputs: drilling efforts , geophysic efforts,
and land acquisition. Each input requires cost. The total
costs of this process is called the total exploration costs.
The outputs of this process is new oil discoveries, which is
indicated by reserves addition from new discoveries.
There are many definitions of ’reserves’ in the oil industry.
In this thesis, the data for new oil discoveries is from the
records of primary addition to the initial recoverable
reserves (enhanced oil recovery, or EOR, is not included) per
discovery year. The data shows that the ratio of reserves
addition from new discoveries to total reserves addition is
decreasing in Saskatchewan. It does not perform as well as
it does in Alberta.
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The wellhead prices in both regions resemble the world price
level indicating that the crude markets are very competitive.
The markets for crude oil in Saskatchewan and Alberta are
mainly the North American markets. Historically speaking, the
behaviour of price path in the market can be divided into
three eras: stable oil price, rising oil price, and volatile
oil price. From this fact, it follows that the analysis of
costs is important.
Furthermore, the market connections for crude exists at some
costs, namely the transportation costs. There are several
ways of transporting crude to the market. For the oil
industry in Western Canada, the cheapest long-run alternative
of transporting crude is pipelines. To remain competitive,
to build the pipelines is required. However, the costs of
building these pipelines are high. This is when the support
from the governments through their policies are important.
In Canada, there are two governments involved: the Crowns,
and the Federal government. There are three prominent roles
of the governments’ involvement in the oil industry: price
control, controlling access to reserves, and taxation.
Intervening the oil industry, the governments have regularly
affect the producers’ profit expectations in crude oil
exploration activities.
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The governments receive revenues from collecting royalties
and taxes. The rates of royalties and taxes are determined
by the Crowns. Even then, the complex structures of taxation
often create debates between the provincial and the federal
governments. This will also affect the crude oil exploration
activities. 
For Saskatchewan and Alberta oil industries, the Crowns
policies are effective in regulating the land input, but not
the drilling and geophysic inputs because labour and capital
are assumed to be very mobile between the two producing
provinces. 
For the producers, the higher the tax rates, the lesser
profits they will receive from the production of oil. Thus,
royalties and taxes can effect total revenues directly.
Royalties and taxes can also affect the exploration
activities indirectly through the expected incentives
received by the producers. Historical data shows that
Saskatchewan’s royalty and tax rates are always higher than
Alberta’s, and this may partially affect the producers
behaviour toward crude oil exploration in both regions.
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Hotelling, H., “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal of Political Economy,
vol.39, no.2, 1931, p. 140.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
3.1 The Review
In any form of market analysis, the concept of average and
marginal cost is crucial. Finding cost is part of the total
cost and will contribute to both average and marginal cost.
Therefore, the analysis of finding cost is important for the
economic analysis of the oil industry. 
In the competitive market the marginal cost reflects the
supply of the industry. Hotelling puts it this way:
This will not apply to monopoly, where the form of
the demand function is bound to affect the rate of
production, but is characteristic of completely
free competition. The various units of minerals
are then to be thought of for being at any time
all equally valuable, excepting for varying costs
of placing them upon the market 40
Hotelling (1931) explored the study of resource economics in
his article “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources”. The
41
essence behind Hotelling’s hypothesis is that the price minus
marginal cost of an exhaustible resource is expected to grow
exponentially at a rate of interest under ’free competition’.
The marginal revenue minus marginal cost should rise at the
rate of interest in the monopoly market. Monopoly price will
be higher than competitive price, and the difference between
the two prices will depend on the level of production cost.
The assumptions behind Hotelling’s model are: that natural
resources are irreplaceable; there is some fixed stock of
reserves; there is an optimum rate of production; the price
is determined from the total costs of extraction and placing
it upon the market; the final exhaustion will eventually
occur (the quantity of reserve will then becoming zero). This
condition will apply to all exhaustible resources because
there exist a finite time of ultimate exhaustion.
Hotelling’s analysis provides some answers to the price and
costs behaviour over time. He was able to determine the
optimal rate of production in the world where stocks of
reserves are fixed. He provided solutions for the optimal
production path, maximum social value, capital value taxes,
and the price behaviour. The analysis was also extended for
the case of perfect competition, monopoly, and monopolistic
competitions (duopoly). His study became influential in the
modern literature of resource economics.
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Adelman, M.A., “Mineral Depletion, With Special Reference to Petroleum,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 72, no. 1, 1990, p. 1.
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Adelman, M.A., “The World Petroleum Market,” John Hopkins University Press, 1972, p. 6.
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There is however something ’missing’ in Hotelling’s analysis.
For him, the amount of reserves in the ground is fixed. In
reality, oil reserves are progressively added through the
role of explorations, developments, and technological
enhancements. The model fails to recognize the role of
exploration and discovery process within the industry. As
Adelman states: “There is no fixed stock, only a flow into
current inventory, i.e: reserves.” 41
The economic conditions of oil industry worldwide are
analyzed by Adelman (1972) in his book “The World Petroleum
Market”. Adelman’s model provides detailed references to the
oil industry, including the importance of exploration
activities or discovery (finding) process. In an
investigation of long run crude supply, he explained the
process of exploration, development, production from
reserves, and the estimation of costs. The importance of
discovery process in terms of cost is clearly indicated in
the statement: “To leave discovery cost out of the study
would be Hamlet without the prince”. 42
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Ibid, p. 17.
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The underlying hypothesis behind Adelman’s model was the
widening cost-price gap in the world oil industry. During the
1970s the price of crude in the world market increased
enormously, while the total cost of production in the Middle
East was much lower than the total production cost in North
America. The condition led to an increasing power of OPEC.
He then analyzed the ’real price’ of crude oil, that is the
price after the result of interplay of demand, supply and the
competitive level in the market. He points out that if the
oil industry is competitive then a marginal cost analysis is
important. Under the competitive equilibrium the marginal
cost of production should be equal to the real price of oil.
Adelman’s work provides insights for the economic analysis
in this thesis. After considering the role of exploration,
he writes:
Exploration is a process of spending money to find
oil deposits, and the more barrels found per
dollar the lower is the unit finding cost. At any
given time there are a number of places to look,
and the better places are preferred. A
concessionaire deciding which area to turn back
and which to keep is doing an exercise in
increasing costs. 43 (emphasis added)
This is important. Finding cost, according to Adelman, is the
44
Ibid, p. 18.
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total exploration expenditures over the quantity of oil
discoveries. As more oil is discovered, the per-unit finding
cost will decline. ’The better places’ means the lower cost
regions. He expects that the exploration activities will flow
from some higher cost regions to the lower cost ones. Because
the producers have controls over their choices and
preferences, they will choose the most promising area to
conduct exploration activities. He also expects that the
finding costs in all regions will increase over time. The
words that follow suggest that the finding costs in two or
more producing regions tend to converge in the long run:
But at any given time, with exploration plans and
commitments to be made according to what is then
known, the more exploration, the more must it goes
into the less promising places. 44
The hypotheses in this thesis, as stated in Chapter 1,
coincide with Adelman’s expectations.
The important role of exploration in production of ’non-
renewable’ resources (rather than ’exhaustible resources’)
was further examined by Pindyck (1978) in “The Optimal
Exploration and Production of Nonrenewable Resources.” An
important assumption behind his model is that reserves are
45
As noted by Adelman (1967, 1972, 1990).
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Adelman (1972), and Pyndick (1978).
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not fixed stocks, 45 but they are rather improved over time
as exploration ensues. Pindyck introduced a dynamic analysis
of crude oil production under perfect competition and
monopoly. He observed the optimal path of production and
exploration when the initial reserves are both small and
large. He concluded that if the initial reserves are small,
the price path of crude will be U-shaped. But, if the initial
reserves are large, then the price will be steadily
increasing as in Hotelling’s model.
Uhler (1979) in “Oil and Gas Finding Cost” introduces a model
to estimate finding cost in the province of Alberta.
According to Uhler, the previous oil discovery of reserves
will affect the future probability of oil discoveries. As
cumulative discoveries increase and lead initially to an
increase in the discovery rate, this increase in cumulative
discoveries will also lead to a decline in future
undiscovered reserves at a higher rate. Hence, future
discoveries will decline even more. This argument implies
that the costs of finding oil will increase at increasing
rates. Therefore, like other modern literatures of non-
renewable resources, 46 the assumption behind Uhler’s model
is that crude oil production will eventually cease due to the
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This method were also used by Eglington and Uffelmann (1983) in the later research.
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Eglington, P.C., “The Economics of Industry Petroleum Exploration,” Ph.D. dissertation,
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increasing costs.
For Uhler, the definition of ’finding cost’ is the average
cost of finding oil. Uhler estimated this cost by specifying
the production function of the discovery process. He
identifies three inputs: the land acquisitions; drilling
activities; geological activities. The outputs are discovery
of new oil or gas or both. Uhler also takes into account the
effect of future finding probabilities (by cumulative
reserves addition) and the effect of output price information
in the competitive market.
The discovery processes of oil and gas are similar. Both
require the same inputs, thus the same set of data. If the
intention is to estimate either oil or gas, some problems
with the data will occur. In an attempt to overcome this
problem, Uhler adopts the same methodology 47 which was
introduced by Eglington (1975). 48 The data was generated in
the following steps : First, he divided the category wells
intent data (oil, gas, and both intent). Second, he
aggregated the ’both wells intent’ into oil wells intent
category, and he calculated the success rates by dividing oil
49
Uhler argued that the success ratios will be remarkably similar, with or without inclusion
of ‘both wells intent’ category into the calculation of total oil well intent (Uhler
1979:p. 46).
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wells completions by oil wells intent. 49 Third, the
approximation of oil exploratory footage is then calculated
by multiplying this success ratio with the total exploratory
footage.
Using two stages of estimation, Uhler obtained regression
results for the province of Alberta. Once the parameter
estimates were obtained, he analyzed the information of the
substitution possibilities among the three inputs. For Uhler,
drilling and geophysic activities are expected to be
substitutes, but geophysic and land inputs are expected to
be complements. To support his argument, he presented some
empirical results of the elasticities of substitutions. His
results support his expectations.
Another approach of estimating finding cost was conducted by
Livernois (1988) in “Estimates of Marginal Discovery Costs
for Oil and Gas”. He specified the total cost function for
both oil and gas and assumed that multiple outputs technology
is available to circumvent the joint products problem. He
explained that the marginal finding costs of oil and gas are
observable but the breakdown of these costs are not,
therefore some sort of estimation technique is required.
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Livernois used the econometric method of iterative three-
stage least squares estimation to avoid the possibility of
having inconsistent parameters due to simultaneity problems
when the two outputs oil and gas are both on the right-hand
side and are all endogenous to the firms. He is aware of the
inefficiency of the parameter estimates even though they are
consistent. He notes that the use of dummy variables will
reduce the autocorrelation problem. The function is then
differentiated with respect to the two output variables to
get the predicted marginal finding costs. The results are
then compared with the shadow price reserves. He concluded
that the marginal finding costs are considerably smaller and
thus provide poor estimate of the reserve price. This is
understandable since the finding cost is only a proportion
of total cost in the industry.
Cuddington and Moss (1998) attempted to find an evidence of
finding cost reduction due to technological change. They
estimated the finding costs for U.S. petroleum industry by
using two variants of technological indexes in production
function: the technology varieties (TV) model, and the
quality ladder (QL) model. The analytical framework in
estimating finding costs is partly similar to Uhler’s model,
but with a different econometric method. They used the error
correction model (ECM) to avoid auto correlation among
potential endogenous variables. They find evidence of the
50
FC per-unit = TC exploration
            Y discoveries
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impact of technological change on finding cost for US
petroleum industry, though whether this evidence is robust
enough, is still in question.
3.2 Estimating the Volume of New Discoveries
Adelman, Uhler and others realize the importance of finding
activities. They also recognize the peculiar problems
associated with estimating the costs. Even though the total
cost of exploration can easily be determined by knowing the
total expenditures spent for the activities, it is difficult
to measure the quantity of new discoveries. Therefore, the
estimates of per-unit finding cost face a high level of
uncertainty. 50 To estimate the finding cost requires some
method of estimating the quantity of new oil reserves.
There are many methods to estimate the reserves and new oil
discoveries, for example: geological; mathematical economics;
engineering; statistical; and econometric method. Geological
methods (Mossop 1997) of estimating reserves is through a
knowledge of crude oil that trapped within the sedimentary
rocks. Mathematical economics (Hotelling 1931, Pyndick 1978)
and engineering methods (Hubbert 1962), are methods of
estimation through some functional forms and logical
arguments. The statistical (Kaufman 1963, Eckbo, Jacoby, and
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Smith 1978, Smith 1980) and econometric methods (Fisher 1964,
Khazzoom 1971, Erickson and Spann 1971, MacAvoy and Pindyck
1973, Epple 1975, Uhler 1979, Livernois 1987, Cuddington and
Moss 1998) are estimation methods through the process of
collecting complex data, and using it to estimate the
relations among variables that are believed to be important.
Each method has its special features and importance in the
analysis of discovery process, and they all have contributed
significantly to provide public information which is widely
available. The estimates of new oil discoveries in this
thesis rely on the reported data issued by the governments.
It is assumed to be reliable.
3.3 Summary
The review of the literature suggests that the producers will
exploit profitable opportunities quickly in facing
competition in the market. The price will be determined in
the market. The costs will increase due to resource scarcity.
Faced with two producing regions, the lower cost region is
preferred to the higher cost region. Labour and capital are
assumed to be mobile. For the producers, it is important to
estimate these costs.
Crude oil exploration activities are vital for the industry.
These activities are the first step toward success, or
51
The definition of ‘scarcity’ here is the ‘economic scarcity,’ in essence of Adelman (1972,
1990), Pindyck (1978),and Uhler (1976, 1979, 1986).
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failure, of the producers to create profit in the market.
There are expenses involve in this activity, namely the
exploration expenditures. These expenditures will become
worthwhile investments once large quantity of new discoveries
are made. The larger the quantity of new discoveries the
lower per-unit exploration (finding) cost, and the greater
the economic incentives to the producers.
The literature also describes that to estimate per-unit
finding cost is difficult due to the uncertainty problem of
discovery process. Thus, it is expected that the estimates
of unit finding cost will be highly volatile. Nevertheless,
an increasing trend of unit finding cost estimates remains
to be seen because of the scarcity 51 problem.
In the following chapter, a model of finding cost will be
developed. Even though the model is simple, it is yet very
useful because the model makes it possible to estimate
finding cost, based on the information which is available.
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Uhler, R.S., “Oil and Gas Finding Costs,” Study no.7, Canadian Energy Research Institute,
1979.
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Chapter 4
Estimation and Empirical Results
Based on the background of exploration activities for both
provinces provided in Chapter 2 and the review of literature
described in Chapter 3, one would expect per-unit finding
costs to be highly volatile due to the uncertainty of
discovery process. One would also expect these costs to
increase at an increasing rate due to resource scarcity
problems.
This chapter aims at estimating these costs. Uhler’s (1979)
model will be used to obtain the empirical results in each
provinces. 52 These results will be compared with ex-post
(actual) per-unit finding costs for that province. The model
also allows one to discuss the partial elasticities of
substitutions of inputs based on the parameter estimates from
each regression.
53
4.1 Discovery process
The discovery process of crude oil is viewed as a function
of efforts, cumulative reserve addition, and information of
output price. Uhler specifies the function of oil discovery
as:
y = N(gj,a,i)    (4.1)         +   -   +
where: y is oil, gas or both discoveries; gj are the usual
inputs due to oil exploration: drilling efforts, geophysic
efforts, and land acquisitions; a is cumulative reserve
addition; and i is information of competitive output price.
The positive and negative signs on the right hand side of
equation (4.1) indicate the effect of each variable on y.
Even though gj, a, and i altogether will simultaneously
affect the quantity of oil or gas discoveries (y), each
variable will capture separate effects on the discovery
process. The inputs gj are assume to be increasing in new oil
discoveries. The cumulative reserve addition captures the
depletion effect of oil reserves in finding process. The
output price affects the oil discoveries through the expected
incentives from conducting oil exploration.
To be able to estimate equation (4.1), the notations that
illustrates the separate effects of each category of
independent variables must be described more specifically.
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The more specific function of finding new oil is done by
rewriting equation (4.1) as:
y = f(gj,u1) h(a,u2) g(i,u3)  (4.2)
To estimate equation (4.2) an explicit form of the equation
is needed. The f(gj,u1) function is formulated explicitly as
a translog production form because of the flexibility of this
function. To describe the negative relation between
cumulative reserve addition and oil discovery, h(a,u2) is
formed as a negative exponential function, or h(a)=$e-.a.u2,
as the more oil reserves have been discovered the harder it
is to find new oil in the ground in an exponential fashion.
The function g(i,u3) is formulated as an exponential
function, or g(i)=i*.u3, as a higher crude price will lead to
more exploration activities, and assumably, this will result
in larger quantity of oil discoveries. The notation uj
indicates the error terms. To be able to indicate the
parameter estimates of the independent variables, as well as
to obtain the estimates of the discovery rates, an explicit
function of equation (4.2) is written as:
 Rny = C + ' "0jRngj + ½ '' "jkRngjRngk - .a + *Rni + uj  (4.3)                   j                       j k
To be a well-defined production function, equation (4.3) is
assumed to be homothetic in inputs (efforts). Given a set of
input prices, the function is also assumed to be linearly
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The duality of a production function and a cost function will ensure that the input shares
(sj) should equal the proportion of the expenditures due to jth input of the totalexpenditures.
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homogeneous in inputs by imposing parameter restrictions:
'"0j=1, '"jk=0, j,k=1,2,3. Symmetry of the matrix of second
order derivatives is forced by the following restrictions:
"jk="kj, for all j and k. The cumulative reserve addition
within each province has been aggregated (thus, only one
cumulative reserves in each province). The constant term "00
and Rn$ are embedded in the intercept, therefore only
coefficients C="00+Rn$, "0j, "jk, ., and * will be estimated
separately for each province.
Profit-maximizing behaviour in the competitive input markets
will ensure that the first derivatives of Rny with respect to
Rngj are equal to the proportion of the input shares sj and
the total inputs, written as equation (4.4):
 sj(gj) = MRny/MRngj = "oj + ' "jkRngj         (4.4)                                       j            
There are, however, various measurements of factor inputs
such as: meters for drilling, hectares for land, and man-
hours for geophysics. The best proxies 53 one can use to
estimate these input shares are therefore by the proportion
of each expenditure due to input j of the total expenditures.
In this thesis, equations (4.3) and (4.4) are estimated with
the system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Applying
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Raw data is taken from various sources and can be viewed in the appendix of this thesis.
Discovery data for Saskatchewan is taken from the Saskatchewan Energy and Mines - Reservoir
Annual 1999, and discovery data for Alberta is taken from the ERCB - Alberta Reserves 1985.
The quantity of oil discoveries (y) is per-year total cubic meters discovery of initial
recoverable reserves of oil (aggregate of all type of crude: heavy, medium, light). The
data resulted by adding up all pools data in Alberta and Saskatchewan based on discovery
year of the most recent estimates. Drilling efforts (g1) is measured by total meters of
exploratory drilling each year. The drilling data for both provinces is from Statistic
Canada. Geophysical and geological efforts(g2) is measured by total man-hours for
exploratory wells each year, and the data is taken from Statistics Canada. Land inputs(g3)
is measured by the total hectares of leases, drilling permits, drilling reservations, gas
licenses, gas drilling permits each year. The land data for Saskatchewan is taken from
Saskatchewan Energy and Mines and the land data for Alberta is taken from several sources:
AERCB, Canadian Petroleum Association, and Alberta Bureau of Statistics. The share data of
input j resulted by dividing the expenditure on input j to total exploration expenditures.
The expenditure’s data for both provinces is taken from Statistics Canada. Expenditures of
each input is adjusted with long-term bond yield for ten industrial interest rates (r) that
is taken from Bank of Canada. Cumulative reserves resulted by summing the initial
recoverable reserves of crude every year. Price data for Saskatchewan is taken from Mineral
Statistics Yearbook, and for Alberta is taken from two sources: AERCB Oil and Gas Industry
and Alberta Bureau of Statistics. The price is the average wellhead price (per-cubic meter)
of all type of crude.
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twenty five years of data between 1960 and 1985 for each
region, 54 the empirical results are presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Empirical results by using the system of SUR
Alberta Saskatchewan
Coef. Est. S.E T-stat Coef. Est. S.E T-stat
C 6.085 4.249 1.432 C -7.859 1.952 -4.027
"01 0.543 1.168 0.465 "01 -0.154 0.608 -0.254
"11 0.155 0.081 1.919 "11 -0.284 0.421 -0.675
"12 -0.041 0.061 -0.665 "12 0.076 0.049 1.539
 "13 -0.112 0.087 -1.297 "13 0.037 0.040 0.930
"02 1.157 0.959 1.206 "02 -0.284 0.421 -0.675
"21 -0.041 0.061 -0.665 "21 0.076 0.049 1.539
"22 -0.027 0.068 -0.391 "22 -0.065 0.038 -1.725
"23 -0.008 0.068 -0.121 "23 0.035 0.027 1.288
"03 -0.377 0.756 -0.499 "03 1.103 0.465 2.372
"31 -0.112 0.087 -1.297 "31 0.037 0.040 0.930
"32 -0.008 0.068 -0.121 "32 0.035 0.027 1.288
"33 0.103 0.072 1.429 "33 -0.044 0.033 -1.354
* 0.046 0.379 0.121 * -0.751 0.371 -2.021
. 8.61E-06 4.13E-06 2.083 . -1.8E-05 8.71E-06 -2.056
Eq.(4.3):  R²=0.417, SE=1.088 Eq.(4.3):  R²=0.454, SE=0.893
Eq.(4.4,Sdril): R²=0.280, SE=0.096 Eq.(4.4,Sdril): R²=-0.07, SE=0.142
Eq.(4.4,Sgeo): R²=0.597, SE=0.046 Eq.(4.4,Sgeo): R²=0.135, SE=0.073
55
See: Greene, W.H., “Systems of Regression Equations,” in Econometric Analysis, Fourth
edition, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000, p. 642.
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The results show that the coefficients of all the inputs for
both provinces, except for "22, are of the opposite signs.
This is evidence that the structures of oil discoveries in
the two regions are very different. Both coefficients . and
* are also of the opposite signs, indicating that the market
price information and the cumulative reserves addition affect
the quantity of crude oil discoveries in both regions
differently.
From the model specification, it is quite easy to calculate
the partial elasticity of substitutions (ESjk) of the three
input categories in each producing region. From the results
of the parameter estimates, it can be shown that the partial
elasticity of substitutions (ESjk) among the three inputs
are: 55
 ESjk = "jk + sjsk    (4.5)                            sjsk
Economists are often interested in observing the degree of
substitutability among variable inputs for many reasons: from
simply curiosity to policy recommendations. Uhler(1979) and
Livernois(1987) believe that only drilling and geophysic
inputs are substitutes. It is also reasonable to expect that
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these inputs to be complements because all the three inputs
are required in the process of finding new oil. Nevertheless,
the degree of substitutability and complementarity among the
three inputs may change over time. Drilling oil is the
process with an uncertain outcome. The demand for inputs will
depend on the reliability of the information obtained in the
past. Cumulative information about an area under exploration
changes with the passage of time. When land sale is provided
with a reliable geophysical survey in the past, further
geophysical activity will not be required. Moreover, the
techniques of geological and drilling activities have been
continuously developed. Thus, the degree of complementary and
substitutability should change over time.
The results of elasticity of substitutions at selected points
of observations are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Partial elasticity of substitutions for both
provinces, selected years
Alberta Saskatchewan
Year ES12 ES13 ES23 ES12 ES13 ES23
1980 0.54 0.29 0.86 1.71 1.26 1.74
1981 0.5 0.32 0.8 1.89 1.23 1.51
1982 0.42 0.36 0.86 2.06 1.27 1.32
1983 0.28 0.37 0.89 3.01 1.29 1.32
1984 0.46 0.35 0.88 1.92 1.22 1.54
1985 0.59 0.26 0.85 1.69 1.26 1.57
  Note: -ES12 = Partial elasticity of drilling and geophysics -ES13 = Partial elasticity of drilling and land -ES23 = Partial elasticity of geophysics and land
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These results are consistent with Uhler (1979) and Livernois (1987).
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The price boom during the early 1980s may be one of the reasons that affect the degree of
substitutability among these inputs.
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Recall Equation (4.3).
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The table shows that the results do not support the
expectation of complementarity described above.
The partial elasticity of substitutions for both regions are
positive and relatively stable over time, indicating that all
the three inputs are substitutes. 56 The degree of
substitutability among the three inputs in Saskatchewan is
stronger than it is in Alberta. The information about
prospective lands in both regions have been developed well
in the 1980s. Consequently, these results suggest that
lesser drilling efforts and proportionally more geophysics
efforts (or lesser drilling efforts but buying some vaster
land areas) will yield the same magnitude of crude oil
findings. 57
4.2 Estimation of New Oil Discoveries
The fitted values of the estimations in Table 4.1 can be
interpreted as the log of oil discovery estimates for both
regions. 58 The empirical results of the quantity of oil
discovery estimates are shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Oil discovery estimates - Saskatchewan,1964-1985
Figure 4.2: Oil discovery estimates - Alberta,1964-1985
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The quantity of crude oil discovery estimates in Saskatchewan
fit the data quite well. Some overestimation occur only in
the 1980s by roughly five million cubic meters on average.
Figure 4.2 shows crude oil discovery estimates for Alberta.
They also fit the data well even though few are
underestimated; in 1979, 1983, 1984, and 1985; by around ten
million cubic meters on average.
What are the causes of these over/underestimation? In fact,
this underestimation is not surprising at all given that
information is imperfect. Estimating the ’real world economy’
is very complex. As the consequence, the estimated values are
normally different from the actual values.
4.3 Estimation of Finding Cost
Once the discovery rates are estimated, the next task is to
estimate the finding costs for both provinces. Per-cubic
meter finding cost($/M³) of new oil discoveries can be
calculated by dividing the total exploration expenditures($)
to the predicted value of oil discoveries every year(M³). The
total exploration expenditures of ’efforts’ consist of the
three inputs categories: land, geophysics, and drilling
expenditures. As presented in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, the
total exploration expenditures in both provinces started to
rise after 1975 in response to high activities shortly after
the crude price shock in the international market.
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Adjustments to the total expenditures is provided in appendix - Table A1.1 and A1.2.
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Figure 4.3: Exploration expenditures - Saskatchewan,1964-1985
Figure 4.4: Exploration expenditures - Alberta,1964-1985 59
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It is important to note that the money has already been spent for the activities, but the
outcomes(new oil discoveries) are uncertain. Thus, there are implicit costs involved,
namely the cost of money (potential interest forgone) due to exploration. For example:
producers may invest millions of dollars in a financial institution and received compounded
interests depending on how long the money is invested. The longer it takes to conduct an
activity the costlier the exploration.
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In this thesis, Bank of Canada 3 to 5 years bond rate is used (see Appendix 1). It is
assumed that buying bonds with large sum of money is preferred to any kind of investments
because of smaller risk.
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The adjustments for both regions are tabulated in Appendix 1 (Table A1 and A2).
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It is very reasonable to treat the exploration expenditures
as investments. When a new exploration activity begins, the
money is spent, but there is no guarantee whatsoever that a
profitable new oil discovery will be made. The average time
lag between land expenditures invested and oil discoveries
occurred (if any) is around three years. Two years time lag
is assumed for geophysical expenditures, and only one year
for drilling expenditures. 60 For example: the expenditures
on land will become costs in the next three years, when the
exploration result is known. Thus, the expenditures should
be compounded by (1+r)³, where r is the interest rate. 61
Similarly, the geophysical expenditures should be compounded
by (1+r)² and the drilling expenditures by (1+r).
The total cost 62 is then the sum of all the expenditures
associated with the three categories of inputs, after
adjustments to the average time lag and the potential
interest forgone were made.
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Once the total cost is yielded, the average finding cost can
now be calculated by dividing these adjusted total
expenditures by the estimated oil discoveries from the
previous section. The results are presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Finding cost per-unit, estimates and real ex-posts
- Saskatchewan and Alberta, 1964-1985
Saskatchewan Alberta
Year TC
(Mil
$)
Oil
Disc
(Mil
M³)
Est.
Disc
(Mil
M³)
FC
Real
($/M³)
FC 
Est.
($/M³)
TC
(Mil
$)
Oil
Disc
(Mil
M³)
Est.
Disc
(Mil
M³)
FC
Real
($/M³)
FC 
Est.
($/M³)
1964 16.65 13.53 3.47 1.23 4.79 154.9 36.63 26.99 4.23 5.74
1965 22.88 15.87 3.92 1.44 5.83 143.8 66.98 20.42 2.15 7.04
1966 19.53 3.28 3.23 5.94 6.05 167.9 46.66 13.55 3.60 12.39
1967 26.93 6.51 3.82 4.14 7.05 224.9 34.85 18.33 6.45 12.27
1968 35.00 11.97 6.38 2.92 5.49 298.6 17.68 15.99 16.89 18.67
1969 35.92 10.37 6.48 3.46 5.55 323.6 11.22 11.07 28.86 29.24
1970 35.27 3.49 2.65 10.1 13.33 301.3 3.33 2.63 90.40 114.62
1971 19.85 9.17 2.38 2.16 8.32 304.7 8.34 3.71 36.53 82.07
1972 14.94 5.78 1.71 2.58 8.73 307.3 2.97 1.68 103.44 183.14
1973 13.23 3.28 3.10 4.04 4.27 214.5 11.23 1.97 19.10 109.08
1974 13.10 6.50 0.50 2.02 25.95 250.3 3.85 3.60 64.98 69.61
1975 15.74 0.22 0.15 70.88 105.6 317.6 1.34 2.85 236.27 111.61
1976 15.53 2.01 1.17 7.74 13.28 394.3 5.55 4.32 70.99 91.20
1977 19.57 2.94 2.94 6.66 6.65 524.6 9.91 4.20 52.91 124.98
1978 26.51 5.58 6.79 4.75 3.9 762.3 28.91 5.78 26.37 131.81
1979 42.19 10.31 11.07 4.09 3.81 1,182 19.97 7.49 59.23 157.98
1980 78.86 11.17 20.18 7.06 3.91 2,295 12.18 10.18 188.37 225.48
1981 151.7 2.49 8.16 60.98 18.59 3,102 9.00 7.11 344.62 436.10
1982 160.6 6.06 5.87 26.5 27.36 3,765 21.10 4.49 178.45 838.04
1983 186.8 3.93 5.81 47.57 32.15 3,214 23.56 5.71 136.45 563.25
1984 162.2 3.84 8.64 42.28 18.79 2,482 15.26 5.28 162.73 470.16
1985 225.2 8.07 13.38 27.9 16.83 2,410 1.37 8.64 1,765. 279.05
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Figure 4.5: Crude Oil FC - Saskatchewan VS Alberta, 1964-1985
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Figure 4.6: FC high vs FC low in 95% confidence interval -
both regions, 1964-1985
63
Source: Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Reservoir Annual 1999, Initial Reserves-Primary, p.
C-2 - C-21.
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Source: ERCB - Alberta Reserves 1985, Initial Established Reserves-Primary, p. 2-2 - 2-145.
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The limited size of the time series data has caused the
results to be less robust than they would have been with a
larger sample. The last ten years of discovery estimates are
overestimated for Saskatchewan. Actual discoveries 63 made
during this period was 5.64 million M³, but the estimation
in Table 4.3 is 8.4 million M³. While they are overestimated
for Saskatchewan, underestimations occur for Alberta.
Alberta’s actual data 64 of new oil discoveries from 1976 to
1985 was 14.68 million M³, but the average estimates is only
8.71 million M³. It is not clear why one set of estimates
should differ in this matter from the other set of estimates.
Figure 4.6 is therefore depicted at 95% confidence interval
in an attempt to show the significance of the finding cost
differences are between the two regions.
Nevertheless, Table 4.3 reveals some puzzles about total
finding costs and new oil discoveries in the two producing
regions. In each province there appears to be three separate
periods in terms of the movements of the total finding costs
and the oil discoveries.
First, in Alberta between 1964 and 1967, total finding cost
was relatively low with large but declining discoveries. From
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1968 to 1976 the total cost was higher with declining
discoveries. Finally from 1977 onwards, there was a rapid
increase in the total finding cost with an increase in
discoveries in some years, and small discoveries in other
years.
Second, from 1964 to 1970, Saskatchewan’s total finding cost
was increasing with some large discoveries in some years, but
small discoveries in other years. From 1971 to 1977 the total
cost was fairly stable with declining oil discoveries. At
last, between 1978 to 1985, the total finding cost increase
sharply, with increasing but volatile oil discoveries.
In general, the total finding costs in both regions increased
slowly in the 1960s and the early 1970s, but they increased
very rapidly in the late 1970s and the 1980s. Some cyclical
variations indeed occurred around their secular trends, but
they did not vary largely. Even so they were increasing, the
magnitude of new oil discoveries in the last period were not
as large as its level in the 1960s. By 1976, a trend of
increasing finding costs emerged in both regions.
The increasing trends were assumably triggered by the first
world oil price shock. But if the price shock is really
responsible in the upward trends of the total finding costs,
how and through what channels did it affect the costs?
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International crude prices had been increasing as a
consequence of OPEC output limitations. The Canadian
government responded with policies to encourage an expansion
in domestic oil supplies. The domestic supply responses
encountered the scarcity problem with increasing finding
costs.
Alberta’s total cost started to rise enormously in 1976. In
the course of five years alone (1976-1980), the total cost
had increased by 482%, from the total of CAD 394 millions in
1976 to more than CAD 2.29 billions in 1981. The average
spending for the next five years (1981-1985) stayed on
average of CAD 3 billions per year, while the quantity of oil
discoveries did not keep up with the money spent. Actual data
from Alberta ERCB indeed showed some large oil discoveries
(an average of more than twenty millions M³ per year) were
made for few years; in 1978, 1979, 1982, and 1983; however,
these ’large’ discoveries must be paid with even larger
spending (total cost of explorations). Finding costs per-unit
therefore increased during this period.
The total cost for Saskatchewan also increased, but not as
much as in Alberta during this period. From 1976 to 1980, it
increased by 407%, from CAD 15.53 millions to CAD 78.86
millions. In the next five years (1981-1985), the average
spending was only CAD 177.35 millions per-year. The records
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of the quantity of new oil discoveries in Saskatchewan,
however, is 38% of Alberta’s discoveries. Thus, the average
finding cost per-unit of new oil in Saskatchewan was much
smaller than it was in Alberta during this period.
The analysis of the increasing finding costs in Saskatchewan
and Alberta since 1976 has revealed another puzzle. Why were
the finding cost increases in Saskatchewan so much less than
the cost increases in Alberta? By 1985, Saskatchewan’s
finding cost per-unit was about CAD 200 less per cubic meter
of crude. Why were the producers spending so much to find new
oil in Alberta, compared with Saskatchewan, when the return
on investments on new oil discoveries was clearly better in
Saskatchewan?
4.4 Summary
Unit finding costs in both regions were stable during the
1950s and 1960s. There were basically no differences in unit
finding costs between the two regions when the quantity of
crude oil in the ground was plentiful and cheap (recall
Figure 4.5). After 1976, the results show that the trend of
unit finding costs in both regions increased at an increasing
rate and that they were highly volatile due to the
uncertainty of discovery process. These facts are consistent
with the hypothesis developed in Chapter 1, and the
literature described in Chapter 3.
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When the unit finding cost curves started to increase in the
1970s, the cost differences between Saskatchewan and Alberta
emerged. There were few years when per-unit finding cost
curves moved toward convergence, for examples: in 1978, 1982,
and 1983. However, a divergence persisted shortly after those
years. The average real finding cost differences between 1964
and 1975 were approximately CAD 40/M³. Between 1976 to 1985,
the average differences increased to more than CAD 200/M³.
It is quite surprising that Saskatchewan’s unit finding cost
was significantly lower than Alberta’s, despite records of
lesser quantities of new oil discovered in that province. The
gap of per-unit finding cost differences between the two
regions started at the end of 1970s, and has been widening
ever since.
The next chapter will explore the possible causes of per-unit
finding cost differences between the two regions.
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Chapter 5
The Causes
Lower finding costs in Saskatchewan (Chapter 4) suggest that
exploration activities in Saskatchewan promise higher returns
than in Alberta (Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the number of
exploration activities in Saskatchewan is considerably
smaller than it is in Alberta (Chapter 2). What factors might
explain the lower finding cost in Saskatchewan, compared with
Alberta, and why have the firms not taken advantage of the
cost differentials? To answer these questions let us examine
the causes which might be responsible for the finding costs
differences during the 1980s.
Exploration activities must be related to the producers’
expected payoffs from new discoveries. Well-informed and
rational producers will seek to maximize their expected
profits. When finding costs differ between two regions, under
competitive conditions, the producers are expected to take
advantage of the lower finding cost and expand their
activities in the low cost region. They will continue to do
so until their finding costs have been equalized between the
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two regions.
There may be three possible reasons why the producers might
act on the view that Alberta is a more promising area: 
1. The expected magnitude (quantity) of finding new oil.
2. The expected quality of new oil discoveries.
3. The impact of provincial public policies.
All of them will affect the future profit expectations.
5.1 The Expected Quantity of New Oil
The expected quantity of finding oil, or the size of
reservoirs, is crucial in decision making because large
reservoirs mean large payoffs. The process of finding these
reservoirs, however, is risky.
The literature recognizes different types of risks:
1. Geological risk, 
2. Commercial risk
3. Political risk
Geological risk reflects the possibility of finding no new
oil in place. Commercial risk is the possibility of finding
new reservoirs, but the costs of development and production
activities are sufficiently high to render the new
discoveries non-viable. Political risk is a measure of future
actions undertaken by the host government with respect to
property rights, leasing rights, and royalties and production
65
See: Altman, M., “Worker Satisfaction and Economic Performance,” M.E. Sharpe, New York,
2001.
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taxes which may jeopardize the future economic viability of
new discoveries. These risks will influence the firms’
assessments of the expected profitability of exploration
activities in a given region.
The producers’ reactions towards risks will depend heavily
on their risk taking or risk avoidance decisions. The framing
of decisions of the producers’ behaviour involves complex
studies of psychology and economics. 65 It is difficult to
determine whether the producers will make risky investments
or not with regards to the expected size of reservoirs prior
to new oil finding. It may depend on several factors and is
a matter which has not been pursued in this thesis.
Sufficient information is not available to analyze finding
activities by firm characteristics that would allow an
analysis of risk taking and crude oil explorations.
It is nevertheless a fact that the average size of past
reservoirs discovered in Alberta has exceed the average size
of reservoirs in Saskatchewan. Consequently, it can be
assumed that many producers may have a preference towards
exploring in Alberta. Information is not available to measure
the strength of this preference.
66
Source: Shell Canada Website <http://www.shell.ca/code/prices/oilprices.html>.
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5.2 The Expected Quality of New Oil
There are basically three grades of quality of crude; light,
medium, and heavy crude. The historical data presented in
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show that the quality of crude discoveries
in Saskatchewan are spread evenly among the three types of
crude. More than 90% of the quality of crude discoveries in
Alberta consist of high quality light crude. If the producers
believe that there is higher probability of finding light
crude in Alberta compared with Saskatchewan, the expected
incentives of finding oil in Alberta will be stronger.
According to the information from Shell Canada, 66 the posted
crude price at Edmonton indicates that the average difference
between the price of sweet light crude and the price of heavy
crude ranges from CAD 40/M³ to CAD 50/M³. 
Heavy crude can also be converted into medium and light crude
at some cost. The conversion cost per-cubic meter of heavy
crude into light crude is roughly equal to the price
difference between the light crude and the heavy crude. Thus,
the discoveries of better quality of crude imply higher
revenues to the producers, and therefore greater incentives
will be offered. The decision of choosing an exploration area
will therefore be influenced by the expectation of finding
the best quality of crude.
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Source: Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Reservoir Annual 1999, Initial Reserves-Primary, p.
C-2 - C-21.
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Figure 5.1: The quality and quantity of oil discoveries in
Saskatchewan, 1960-1985 67
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Source: ERCB - Alberta Reserves 1985, Initial Established Reserves-Primary, p. 2-2 - 2-145.
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Figure 5.2: The quality and quantity of oil discoveries in
Alberta, 1960-1985 68
69
Source: Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Annual Report, 1984/1985, p. 28.
78
5.3 Public Policies in the 1980s
The producers’ expected profits will also be sensitive to the
public policies by the federal or the provincial governments.
The provincial government can control the producers expected
profits through royalties and taxes, while the federal
government can control them through the reference oil prices
and taxes. The following sections will examine these
policies.
5.3.1 Provincial Oil Taxation
There were significant differences between Alberta and
Saskatchewan royalties and production tax rates during the
1980s. The data show that Saskatchewan’s royalties were
higher than Alberta’s by roughly 5% to 37%, depending on the
quantity of monthly production. They are tabulated in Table
5.1.
Table 5.1: Royalty rates-Saskatchewan and Alberta, 1985 69
Monthly Prod.
(M³)
Royalty & Prod. Tax-New Oil (non-heavy)
                 (%)
Saskatchewan Alberta
<5 0 - 25 0 - 8
50-100 25 - 33 8 - 12
100-150 33 - 36 12 - 18
150-200 36 - 38 18 - 21
200-250 38 - 39 21 - 26
250-300 39 - 40 26 - 29
>300 40 29 - 31
70
See: Alberta Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, Annual Report, 1985.
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In addition to lower royalty rates, the Government of Alberta
offered many advantages to producers who explored for crude
during the 1980s. For example, there were tax exemptions, tax
rebates, and a five percent Incentives Program (PIP) offered
to the producers who explored oil in Alberta. 70 Similar
incentives were not offered in Saskatchewan. When these items
are included, Alberta producers will enjoy an additional 10%
royalty and tax advantage.
5.3.2 Federal Price Control (National Energy Program/NEP)
The federal government together with the provincial
governments had created a significant gap between the
reference prices of old oil and new oil, and between Canadian
prices and international prices in the 1980s. The price
difference between old oil and new oil was around CAD 116/M³
during this period. To produce new oil, one must find it
first. For the producers in both regions, the incentives were
strong to explore for new oil. The exploration activities in
both regions increased enormously in the early 1980s.
5.4 A Restatement of the Finding Cost Differentials
A rough accounting of the producers’ expected payoffs from
crude oil exploration is presented in Table 5.2. The
71
Source: Shell Canada Website <http://www.shell.ca/code/prices/oilprices.html>.
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information in the table is taken from various sources
throughout this thesis.
Table 5.2: Expected netback to the producers, average monthly
production 100 M³ - Saskatchewan and Alberta, 1985
 Saskatchewan Alberta
Reference Price of ’new oil’ (regulated) $ 270/M³ $ 270/M³
Provincial royalty rates for monthly
production around 100 M³ (SK=-33%, AB=-12%)
($ 89.1/M³) ($ 32.4/M³)
Tax rebate, tax credit, tax incentive (PIP)
(SK=0, AB=-10%)
$ 0 $ 27/M³
Expected quality differences (conversion
cost) (SK=heavy oil, AB=light oil)
($ 50/M³) $ 0
Netback Price 
(after taxes and conversion factor)
$ 130.9/M³ $ 264.6/M³
The average crowns’ royalties and production tax rates
difference are tabulated in Table 5.1. The cost of converting
heavy crude to light crude is based on industry estimates.71
The netback price to the producers is calculated by
subtracting the taxes and the conversion costs from the
reference price.
The difference in netback prices between Alberta and
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Saskatchewan is estimated at about CAD 133.7/M³. This means
higher incentives from explorion in Alberta compared with
Saskatchewan during this period. The difference in estimated
netback prices is significant and goes a long way to explain
why finding costs are likely to be lower in Saskatchewan.
We began our analysis of finding costs by assuming
competitive market conditions. We assumed that exploration
costs in different regions would show a tendency to converge.
Different tax structures and rate levels will cause the
producers to react. If the reference price is the same for
oil produced in different regions but output taxes differ
between the two regions, the producers will reduce outputs
in the high tax region in an attempt to equalize the net
price received from the last unit produced in both regions.
The result is that production (finding) costs will therefore
differ and the anticipated convergence of finding costs will
not occur.
5.5 Summary
It is possible to offer three reasons to explain why the oil
discovery costs in Saskatchewan are likely to be lower than
in Alberta. First, the quantity of crude oil discoveries in
Saskatchewan was smaller than the quantity of oil discoveries
in Alberta. Second, most of oil discoveries in Alberta
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consisted of high quality light crude, which is valued more
than heavy crude. Finally, public policies of the two
provinces were different in the 1980s. The differences
between these policies have created strong incentives to
explore in Alberta and discouraged exploration activities in
Saskatchewan. And as suggested above, the tax differences are
important in explaining the finding cost differences and why
Saskatchewan has become a ’lower cost’ finding region.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The analysis of twenty five years of data show that finding
costs for both provinces are increasing as expected. The
evidence that these costs will tend to converge in the long
run is less clear. An important finding is that per-unit
finding costs in Saskatchewan is significantly lower than it
is in Alberta over time. 
The real finding costs per-cubic meter of crude differed by
roughly CAD 50/M³ on average from 1965 to 1979. This result
was expected. The producers’ willingness to spend more to
explore crude oil in Alberta, where oil findings consisted
mostly of light crude, mirrors the cost of converting heavy
crude into light crude at around CAD 50/M³. Alberta is
therefore expected to have a higher per-unit finding cost
compared with Saskatchewan.
The finding cost difference increased to roughly CAD 200 per-
cubic meter in the early 1980s. It is largely explained by
the different public policies in the two provinces as
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indicated in the previous chapter. Alberta has continuously
served as a low-tax regime, but Saskatchewan has not. Public
policies designed to encourage exploration activities clearly
attracted many firms to explore in Alberta. To the extent the
policies sought to encourage more drilling in Alberta they
were successful. To the extent they were designed to discover
more oil they were much less successful.
The aggregate consequences of public policies are best
illustrated by looking at the total finding costs in
Saskatchewan and Alberta between 1976 and 1985. This was the
time of very active federal energy policies, and equally
active provincial policies. The federal government’s National
Energy Program (NEP) was designed to increase the supply of
crude oil produced in Canada by offering subsidies and
extensive tax incentives.
In Alberta between 1976 and 1985 the total cost of
exploration was close to CAD 20 billions. The total quantity
of crude oil discoveries (all types) during this period was
about 147 million cubic meters. In the same period, the total
cost of exploration in Saskatchewan was about CAD 1 billion
and discoveries amounted to 56 million cubic meters. Clearly,
exploration activities in Saskatchewan offered better returns
from 1976 to 1985.
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The combination of federal and provincial incentive policies
to stimulate exploration appears to have created very
expensive ’new oil’ discoveries in Alberta.
The future consequences of these developments and the
importance of public policies to shape the ’finding process’
of new oil in Canada are important issues. It is interesting
to speculate that the higher taxes and royalties imposed in
Saskatchewan may have contributed to a more efficient supply
process of new sources of crude in Canada. It is bothersome
to observe that billions of dollars were spent in Alberta,
encouraged by public policies, searching for new oils and
finding little. Is this evidence of policy induced
misallocation of resources or is it simply the normal outcome
of the process of searching for new oil?
 
The evidence from this thesis is raising many issues and
questions for future research, which were not anticipated
when this study was initiated.
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Appendix
Data
Table A1.1: Total exploration cost - Saskatchewan
Year Drillin
g
Geo Land Bond
Rate
Interest forgone Total Costs, adjusted and lagged
($ ($ ($ ( r) (1+r) (1+r)^ (1+r)^ Drill(1+ Geo(1+r)^2 Land(1+r)^3 TOTAL
a b c ($ ($ Thou.) ($ Thou.) ($ Thou.)
1961 4858 2942 1330 0.04 1.04 1.09 1.14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1962 6503 3597 3767 0.05 1.05 1.09 1.14 5070.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
1963 10717 3783 5378 0.04 1.04 1.09 1.14 6802.1 3205.1 0.0 0.0
1964 13792 2508 8381 0.05 1.05 1.10 1.15 11197.1 3935.5 1512.3 16645.0
1965 10147 6382 11608 0.05 1.05 1.10 1.15 14443.1 4129.5 4311.1 22883.8
1966 9738 6376 7242 0.06 1.06 1.11 1.18 10644.1 2750.4 6133.7 19528.2
1967 13728 11921 9586 0.06 1.06 1.12 1.18 10278.3 7022.6 9624.9 26925.8
1968 13222 11196 5546 0.07 1.07 1.14 1.21 14502.3 7103.2 13399.0 35004.4
1969 10431 6004 5031 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 14104.9 13303.6 8515.5 35924.1
1970 5751 2904 4038 0.07 1.07 1.15 1.23 11230.4 12741.1 11301.1 35272.7
1971 5048 2545 2522 0.06 1.06 1.11 1.18 6159.6 6959.5 6732.8 19851.9
1972 5112 3182 5550 0.06 1.06 1.13 1.20 5328.4 3331.3 6278.5 14938.3
1973 6111 2494 5691 0.07 1.07 1.14 1.22 5431.8 2835.6 4961.3 13228.7
1974 5755 989 4486 0.08 1.08 1.17 1.26 6537.8 3592.6 2966.1 13096.5
1975 6875 2920 2353 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 6222.5 2854.5 6658.3 15735.3
1976 9698 3517 10684 0.08 1.08 1.17 1.27 7405.7 1156.2 6968.6 15530.5
1977 18017 5691 15486 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.26 10507.8 3388.2 5670.5 19566.4
1978 20160 12570 42751 0.09 1.09 1.19 1.29 19440.8 4128.9 2941.0 26510.7
1979 40274 23196 53919 0.10 1.10 1.22 1.35 21974.2 6626.0 13590.0 42190.3
1980 60589 31034 79925 0.12 1.12 1.26 1.42 44470.2 14934.2 19455.1 78859.5
1981 42264 25406 38011 0.16 1.16 1.34 1.55 68084.4 28281.5 55362.5 151728.4
1982 34606 22294 42656 0.14 1.14 1.30 1.48 48889.2 39187.3 72589.7 160666.2
1983 67329 40602 117245 0.11 1.11 1.22 1.35 39451.1 33995.5 113407.9 186854.6
1984 100370 41874 132540 0.12 1.12 1.25 1.40 74474.3 28973.7 58835.2 162283.2
1985 130711 71838 155909 0.10 1.10 1.22 1.35 112321.6 49677.1 63198.1 225196.7
1986 53255 34873 26757 0.09 1.09 1.19 1.30 144286.4 52440.0 158674.4 355400.9
1987 50472 36802 67853 0.09 1.09 1.20 1.31 58161.6 87534.8 185748.2 331444.6
1988 86056 38065 46563 0.10 1.10 1.20 1.32 55224.4 41595.0 209706.2 306525.5
1989 43019 29650 55038 0.10 1.10 1.21 1.34 94465.1 44058.7 34854.9 173378.8
1990 57236 35089 52828 0.11 1.11 1.24 1.37 47408.4 45867.6 88881.1 182157.1
1991 40627 26485 34477 0.09 1.09 1.19 1.30 63642.1 36009.3 61590.2 161241.6
1992 28421 18087 25294 0.07 1.07 1.15 1.24 44349.4 43383.2 73662.6 161395.3
1993 77811 46838 111838 0.06 1.06 1.13 1.21 30533.2 31560.7 72625.8 134719.6
1994 114139 60033 232586 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 82836.3 20875.2 44848.7 148560.2
1995 113109 78257 97459 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 123026.6 53083.3 31362.8 207472.7
1996 152793 124611 167441 0.06 1.06 1.13 1.20 121748.6 69746.1 134936.2 326430.9
1997 319615 137205 198316 0.05 1.05 1.11 1.17 162287.8 90668.6 291258.6 544215.0
1998 139686 84732 74214 0.05 1.05 1.11 1.16 336650.5 140579.3 121541.0 598770.8
1999 120960 59750 63213 0.06 1.06 1.11 1.17 146897.3 152220.8 200636.1 499754.3
127613.8 93706.4 231746.9
66504.3 86311.5
74229.1
Source: Various (see page 46).
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Table A1.2: Total exploration cost - Alberta
Year Drillin
g
Geo Land Bond
Rate
Interest forgone Total Costs and interest forgone
($ ($ ($ ( r) (1+r) (1+r)^2 (1+r)^ Drill(1+r) Geo(1+r) Land(1+r)^ TOTAL
a b c ($ Thou.) ($ ($ Thou.) ($
1961 60190 35310 44868 0.04 1.04 1.09 1.14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
1962 55041 38460 33245 0.05 1.05 1.09 1.14 62823.3 0.0 0.0 0
1963 59188 33010 46930 0.04 1.04 1.09 1.14 57572.9 38467.2 0.0 0
1964 66600 37400 85653 0.05 1.05 1.10 1.15 61839.6 42079.7 51018.3 154938
1965 70004 42091 122027 0.05 1.05 1.10 1.15 69744.1 36033.9 38047.1 143825
1966 76041 68166 101140 0.06 1.06 1.11 1.18 73433.6 41014.5 53524.2 167972
1967 77433 99734 89546 0.06 1.06 1.12 1.18 80260.0 46316.2 98365.3 224942
1968 87613 87150 94614 0.07 1.07 1.14 1.21 81800.2 75940.0 140854.9 298595
1969 89745 86402 104068 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 93463.4 111301.2 118926.1 323691
1970 83799 80344 26870 0.07 1.07 1.15 1.23 96622.5 99177.5 105567.8 301368
1971 80793 65528 25031 0.06 1.06 1.11 1.18 89752.9 100152.0 114861.3 304766
1972 102130 71162 65341 0.06 1.06 1.13 1.20 85281.1 92166.5 129873.5 307321
1973 131361 70663 83612 0.07 1.07 1.14 1.22 108519.9 73010.4 33013.9 214544
1974 146474 112396 104313 0.08 1.08 1.17 1.26 140535.5 80345.3 29438.4 250319
1975 149077 99025 132468 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 158372.6 80878.1 78388.9 317640
1976 256452 145538 172898 0.08 1.08 1.17 1.27 160584.5 131398.3 102382.8 394366
1977 394679 223412 592681 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.26 277865.7 114902.9 131855.0 524624
1978 644532 350321 659098 0.09 1.09 1.19 1.29 425868.5 170857.6 165573.2 762299
1979 1027537 349690 1046133 0.10 1.10 1.22 1.35 702534.5 260117.5 219926.1 1182578
1980 1621585 452331 1068648 0.12 1.12 1.26 1.42 1134597.8 416210.0 744587.1 2295395
1981 1543732 352254 604108 0.16 1.16 1.34 1.55 1822188.6 426355.8 853531.4 3102076
1982 1076345 325107 465644 0.14 1.14 1.30 1.48 1785724.9 571167.6 1408381.5 3765274
1983 1017395 372740 565099 0.11 1.11 1.22 1.35 1227042.3 471347.5 1516336.1 3214726
1984 1130290 472308 790179 0.12 1.12 1.25 1.40 1125366.0 422515.2 935066.5 2482948
1985 1368317 480546 1021136 0.10 1.10 1.22 1.35 1264879.3 456052.1 689887.2 2410819
1986 1021280 448875 447332 0.09 1.09 1.19 1.30 1510428.1 591484.9 764781.1 2866694
1987 1010772 420040 841141 0.09 1.09 1.20 1.31 1115373.9 585546.8 1107396.3 2808317
1988 1089410 520907 676536 0.10 1.10 1.20 1.32 1105944.6 535398.0 1373484.0 3014827
1989 837997 428531 551664 0.10 1.10 1.21 1.34 1195863.5 502864.5 582716.0 2281444
1990 950172 452026 614152 0.11 1.11 1.24 1.37 923500.6 627683.5 1101816.6 2653001
1991 852031 395387 457122 0.09 1.09 1.19 1.30 1056520.0 520441.2 894873.6 2471835
1992 574808 329692 344868 0.07 1.07 1.15 1.24 930098.3 558874.6 738344.1 2227317
1993 883118 434420 640734 0.06 1.06 1.13 1.21 617525.8 471161.0 844310.8 1932998
1994 1449774 678970 1217700 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 940152.7 380516.1 594637.8 1915307
1995 1492415 559959 857166 0.08 1.08 1.16 1.25 1562663.1 492344.6 427612.0 2482620
1996 1546916 574313 1050872 0.06 1.06 1.13 1.20 1606410.6 788825.0 773066.3 3168302
1997 1765824 766982 1322719 0.05 1.05 1.11 1.17 1643043.9 648769.1 1524879.2 3816692
1998 2471505 610350 820842 0.05 1.05 1.11 1.16 1859942.4 647908.3 1068970.8 3576822
1999 1698970 590862 143520 0.06 1.06 1.11 1.17 2599096.4 850921.2 1259207.1 4709225
1792427.5 674995.3 1545695.2
657654.6 954645.8
168531.1
Source: Various (see page 46).
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Table A1.3: Government of Canada marketable bonds - average
yields, three to five years (%)
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr Mei Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Avg
1961 4.6 4.42 4.66 4.73 4.78 4.52 4.4 4.25 4.26 3.97 3.89 4.02 4.38
1962 4.14 4.07 4.01 3.89 4.32 5.5 5.41 5.4 5.21 4.5 4.36 4.39 4.60
1963 4.43 4.51 4.61 4.54 4.32 4.18 4.45 4.6 4.54 4.45 4.55 4.58 4.48
1964 4.64 4.57 4.74 4.81 4.71 4.66 4.74 4.8 4.79 4.77 4.79 4.63 4.72
1965 4.53 4.66 4.62 4.58 4.64 4.87 5.05 5.18 5.09 5.12 5.22 5.23 4.90
1966 5.24 5.38 5.37 5.39 5.37 5.39 5.55 6.09 5.76 5.69 5.77 5.58 5.55
1967 5.2 5.16 4.76 4.81 5.4 5.68 5.89 5.98 6.1 6.05 6.17 6.48 5.64
1968 6.53 6.77 7.12 6.87 7.08 6.79 6.44 6.21 6.25 6.48 6.53 7.06 6.68
1969 6.99 7.03 7.27 7.33 7.69 7.62 7.64 7.71 8.06 8.02 8.31 8.29 7.66
1970 8.23 8 7.32 7.35 7.38 7.07 6.96 7.21 7.12 7.08 6.12 5.42 7.11
1971 5.37 5.54 5.19 5.52 5.86 6.02 6.46 6 5.63 5.04 4.94 5.09 5.56
1972 5.46 5.84 6.29 6.43 6.53 6.68 6.59 6.71 6.57 6.21 5.77 6 6.26
1973 6.25 6.3 6.5 6.67 7.4 7.19 7.39 7.54 7.25 7.09 6.98 7.25 6.98
1974 6.99 6.76 7.57 8.56 8.74 9.24 9.27 9.38 8.89 7.8 7.32 6.96 8.12
1975 6.4 6.38 6.8 7.55 7.31 7.53 8.1 8.36 8.85 8.3 8.64 8.41 7.72
1976 8.21 8.38 8.53 8.46 8.35 8.5 8.55 8.43 8.49 8.44 8.15 7.71 8.35
1977 7.74 7.68 7.85 8.01 7.74 7.76 7.81 7.9 8.01 8.12 8.11 8.1 7.90
1978 8.36 8.46 8.69 8.82 8.85 8.86 8.86 8.86 8.96 9.51 9.84 9.92 9.00
1979 9.88 10 9.89 9.52 9.65 9.73 9.92 10.5 10.9 11.8 11.6 11.7 10.42
1980 12.5 13.2 13.9 11.8 10.9 10.5 11.5 12.3 13 13.2 13.2 12.6 12.37
1981 13.1 13.6 14 15.5 15.6 15.8 18 17.8 18.8 17.1 13.8 15.2 15.68
1982 16.1 15 15.1 14.9 14.9 16.2 15.8 13.6 12.9 11.9 11.2 10.6 14.00
1983 10.8 10.5 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.4 10.8 11.3 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.8 10.61
1984 10.7 11.3 11.9 12.2 13.2 13 13 12.3 12.1 11.5 11 10.8 11.91
1985 10.5 11.6 11.4 10.9 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.2 10.3 9.88 9.56 9.33 10.39
1986 9.95 9.71 9.3 8.96 9.2 9.06 9.19 9.09 9.23 9.18 8.88 8.81 9.21
1987 8.2 8.24 7.97 9.35 9.41 9.27 9.89 10.1 10.9 9.79 10 9.95 9.42
1988 9.23 9.03 9.31 9.56 9.61 9.63 9.92 10.4 10.1 9.78 10.3 10.4 9.77
1989 10.3 10.8 11 10.5 10.1 9.67 9.59 9.9 10.2 9.88 10.4 10.2 10.20
1990 10.3 11.5 11.7 12.4 11.7 11.4 11.3 10.8 11.4 11 10.5 10.5 11.19
1991 10.1 9.57 9.56 9.51 9.38 9.77 9.65 9.39 8.84 8.06 8.19 7.95 9.16
1992 7.9 7.94 8.48 8.32 7.8 7.32 6.36 6.3 7.3 6.71 7.4 7.35 7.43
1993 7.46 7.02 6.96 6.98 6.85 6.52 6.22 6.02 6.27 5.87 5.86 5.47 6.46
1994 5.09 5.81 7.37 7.28 7.95 8.75 8.8 8.18 8.2 8.37 8.64 9 7.79
1995 9.15 8.44 8.25 7.92 7.39 7.22 7.7 7.49 7.47 7.47 6.65 6.51 7.64
1996 6.12 6.66 6.89 6.92 6.84 6.88 6.69 6.32 5.99 5.29 4.77 5.2 6.21
1997 5.37 5.19 5.61 5.81 5.76 5.23 5.16 5.31 5.08 4.94 5.13 5.37 5.33
1998 5.08 5.27 5.13 5.34 5.23 5.31 5.44 5.66 4.83 4.76 5.09 4.81 5.16
1999 4.83 5.28 5 5 5.36 5.38 5.56 5.53 5.68 6.24 6.01 6.14 5.50
2000 6.39 6.31 6.17 6.2 6.21 6.08 6.03 5.94 5.81 5.79 5.63 5.32 5.99
Source: Bank of Canada, Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis.
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Table A1.4: Reserves addition estimates - both provinces
Table A1.4.1 Table A1.4.2
Crude oil in Saskatchewan Crude oil in Alberta
Reserve, Production, and Addition, 1971-1998 Addition, 1951-1985
Year Remaining Rsrv. Yearly Prod  Addition Addition from  Addition Addition from
(000 m³/year) (000 m³) (000 m³) New Discoveries (000 m³) New Discoveries
1961 n/a n/a n/a n/a 57700 1700
1962 n/a n/a n/a n/a 44600 2900
1963 n/a n/a n/a n/a 56400 14600
1964 n/a n/a n/a n/a 348500 9500
1965 n/a n/a n/a n/a 68800 28600
1966 n/a n/a n/a n/a 140900 89100
1967 n/a n/a n/a n/a 95100 57200
1968 n/a n/a n/a n/a 119700 62000
1969 n/a n/a n/a n/a 54500 40500
1970 n/a n/a n/a n/a 36900 8400
1971 137000 14052.5 n/a 9173 21900 14000
1972 127000 13724 3724 5782 20000 10800
1973 122000 13651 8651 3278 9300 5100
1974 116000 11753 5753 6497 38400 4300
1975 128000 9380.5 21380.5 222 7000 1600
1976 123000 8869.5 3869.5 2007 -18600 2500
1977 119000 9745.5 5745.5 2939 19100 4800
1978 117000 9636 7636 5577 24400 24900
1979 118000 9380.5 10380.5 10306 34300 19200
1980 118000 9307.5 9307.5 11168 22700 9000
1981 117000 7409.5 6409.5 2488 32600 15000
1982 109707 8139.5 846.5 6062 6900 16800
1983 114295 9526.5 14114.5 3928 64100 21400
1984 115458 10804 11967 3838 41200 29100
1985 122937 11607 19086 8071 64000 32700
1986 106296 11680 -4961 669 n/a n/a
1987 106146 12081.5 11931.5 3588 n/a n/a
1988 112838 12227.5 18919.5 1297 n/a n/a
1989 111909 11753 10824 672 n/a n/a
1990 116896 12227.5 17214.5 4986 n/a n/a
1991 110336 12420 5860 1334 n/a n/a
1992 119515 13370 22549 267 n/a n/a
1993 131213 14970 26668 2621 n/a n/a
1994 135283 17190 21260 3449 n/a n/a
1995 148202 18750 31669 2477 n/a n/a
1996 156808 20940 29546 2989 n/a n/a
1997 176631 23460 43283 1279 n/a n/a
1998 180928 23150 27447 999 n/a n/a
Source:
(1)Saskatchewan Energy and Mines, Reservoir Annual, 1971-1999, p. C-1.
(2)ERCB Annual report, 1985, p. 7-2.
(3)Statistic Canada, 26-213-XPB,1985 to 1999.
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Table A1.5: Raw data - Saskatchewan
year sd sg sl drill geo land oil
intent
gas
intent
xdo xgo xlo
1961 0 0 0 139196 1017587 896399 0.95 0.05 132574.27 969176.414 853753.71
1962 0 0 0 222926 1192217 1622163 0.86 0.14 190819.5 1020511.7 1388536.5
1963 0 0 0 304000 2178309 1052738 0.72 0.28 218380.84 1564806.09 756243.03
1964 0.67 0.24 0.09 533485 3900630 2132938 0.96 0.04 509862.77 3727912.9 2038493.1
1965 0.63 0.18 0.19 581397 2513882 2661654 0.86 0.14 500497.89 2164085.8 2291295.7
1966 0.55 0.14 0.31 614635 1182717 3250706 0.90 0.10 551651.7 1061520.49 2917597.4
1967 0.38 0.26 0.36 555024 2393550 3354909 0.85 0.15 469875.51 2026345.24 2840218.3
1968 0.41 0.2 0.38 550740 2017582 1548242 0.75 0.25 415620.91 1522587.61 1168395.9
1969 0.39 0.37 0.24 610155 1073762 1895539 0.74 0.26 450001.33 791920.567 1397997.1
1970 0.32 0.36 0.32 340339 511891.5 1767087 0.57 0.43 192324.52 289268.754 998576.91
1971 0.31 0.35 0.34 326859 367473.2 1179914 0.36 0.64 117529.35 132132.949 424263.67
1972 0.36 0.22 0.42 243988 542504.9 1769451 0.33 0.67 81383.081 180954.777 590207.76
1973 0.41 0.21 0.38 287404 443588.4 706652 0.45 0.55 130102.81 200804.646 319888.89
1974 0.5 0.27 0.23 142925 155319.5 479929 0.16 0.84 23389.315 25417.5847 78539.004
1975 0.4 0.18 0.42 116749 378059 537162 0.09 0.91 10371.732 33585.9263 47720.285
1976 0.48 0.07 0.45 132164 400963.7 537162 0.56 0.44 73457.089 222855.976 298555.11
1977 0.54 0.17 0.29 200858 595051.8 170437 0.76 0.24 152839.99 452796.5 129691.7
1978 0.73 0.16 0.11 357449 1329437 134542 0.91 0.09 323806.92 1204313.11 121879.16
1979 0.52 0.16 0.32 454910 2287423 150740 0.95 0.05 431059.45 2167496.21 142836.89
1980 0.56 0.19 0.25 786255 2752416 227372 0.85 0.15 669278.35 2342921.74 193544.4
1981 0.45 0.19 0.36 459512 1954440 124776 0.59 0.41 268948.39 1143917.84 73030.374
1982 0.3 0.24 0.45 310062 1172027 123962 0.95 0.05 293154.43 1108117.19 117202.4
1983 0.21 0.18 0.61 432175 2072641 240970 0.58 0.42 248794.29 1193177.91 138721.58
1984 0.46 0.18 0.36 727057 2127054 434292 0.51 0.49 367481.21 1075091.42 219507.16
1985 0.5 0.22 0.28 889701 4062385 717404 0.55 0.45 491806.42 2245592.81 396564.39
year xdg xgg xlg po pg ro rg yo yg
1961 6,622.13 48,410.70 42,645.29 17.36 0.0033 252694 80049800 3555 0
1962 32,106.10 171,704.97 233,626.50 18.44 0.0035 255755 80647400 3061 597600
1963 85,619.06 613,502.70 296,495.00 18.85 0.0037 270449 85703300 14694 5055900
1964 23,622.33 172,717.02 94,444.92 19.25 0.0039 283982 85703300 13533 0
1965 80,899.01 349,796.49 370,358.30 19.20 0.0042 299857 88447300 15875 2744000
1966 62,983.30 121,196.15 333,108.60 19.05 0.0043 303142 88460100 3285 12800
1967 85,148.59 367,204.57 514,690.70 19.20 0.0047 309649 89011400 6507 551300
1968 135,118.59 494,994.07 379,846.10 18.89 0.0045 321621 89269600 11972 258200
1969 160,153.77 281,841.53 497,541.90 18.81 0.0044 331990 93223100 10369 3953500
1970 148,013.98 222,622.77 768,510.10 18.72 0.0041 335481 107310600 3491 14087500
1971 209,329.95 235,340.22 755,650.30 20.65 0.0044 344654 110321700 9173 3011100
1972 162,604.52 361,550.14 1,179,243.00 20.69 0.0046 350436 111131100 5782 809400
1973 157,301.39 242,783.76 386,763.10 25.80 0.0048 353714 113354100 3278 2223000
1974 119,535.98 129,901.88 401,390.00 45.12 0.0052 360211 116759500 6497 3405400
1975 106,377.37 344,473.07 489,441.70 57.73 0.0060 360433 116759500 222 0
1976 58,707.31 178,107.73 238,606.90 49.88 0.0070 362440 116970600 2007 211100
1977 48,017.81 142,255.28 40,745.30 59.45 0.0093 365379 117101300 2939 130700
1978 33,642.48 125,124.18 12,662.84 71.62 0.0111 370956 117900600 5577 799300
1979 23,850.35 119,926.73 7,903.11 77.63 0.0159 381262 117945000 10306 44400
1980 116,976.15 409,494.75 33,827.60 92.44 0.0159 392430 133798400 11168 15853400
1981 190,563.21 810,522.27 51,745.63 110.44 0.0175 394918 133800000 2488 1600
1982 16,907.57 63,910.24 6,759.60 145.87 0.0186 400980 133800000 6062 0
1983 183,380.41 879,463.36 102,248.40 172.82 0.0373 404908 137584600 3928 3784600
1984 359,575.49 1,051,962.71 214,784.80 173.13 0.0497 408746 138914400 3838 1329800
1985 397,894.98 1,816,792.26 320,839.60 194.22 0.0565 416817 139478000 8071 563600
Source: Various (see page 46).
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Table A1.6: Raw data - Alberta
Year sd sg sl drill geo land oil
intent
gas
intent
xdo xgo xlo
1961 0 0 0 1011598.3 10146412 31232547.7 0.42 0.59 419799. 4210625 12961091
1962 0 0 0 1035745.5 9873710. 31232547.7 0.45 0.55 464965. 4432491 14020869
1963 0 0 0 1091504.7 10571332 31232547.7 0.58 0.42 635545. 6155322 18185638
1964 0.4 0.27 0.33 916965.2 10566694 31232547.7 0.53 0.47 489498. 5640758 16672694
1965 0.48 0.25 0.26 1038251.8 8990861. 34374316.3 0.63 0.37 654629. 5668841 21673404
1966 0.44 0.24 0.32 948718.35 15126153 32258206 0.63 0.37 599270. 9554631 20376316
1967 0.36 0.21 0.44 969431.64 18581765 31760119.5 0.75 0.25 731082. 1401315 23951413
1968 0.27 0.25 0.47 1354897 15144181 30471133.8 0.70 0.30 953839. 1066141 21451506
1969 0.29 0.34 0.37 1376361 14039622 29022368.9 0.68 0.32 940641. 9595046 19834649
1970 0.32 0.33 0.35 1294658.7 12492987 27625691.7 0.36 0.64 471921. 4553874 10069965
1971 0.29 0.33 0.38 1226713 9359570. 29253724.1 0.47 0.53 573746. 4377568 13682272
1972 0.28 0.3 0.42 1398841.8 9429466. 31659069.9 0.29 0.71 411337. 2772790 9309537.
1973 0.51 0.34 0.15 1649993 8854159 32310182 0.32 0.68 525049 2817507 10281514
1974 0.56 0.32 0.12 1583000 12861411 31430000 0.26 0.74 404241 3284339 8026087.
1975 0.5 0.25 0.25 1458000 9720985. 30830000 0.23 0.77 335394. 2236189 7092049.
1976 0.41 0.33 0.26 1958000 13366857 30598000 0.17 0.83 333231. 2274904 5207472.
1977 0.53 0.22 0.25 1958000 19779330 30520000 0.25 0.75 479923. 4848090 7480724.
1978 0.56 0.22 0.22 2320000 28974342 26217000 0.30 0.70 703508. 8786078 7949952
1979 0.59 0.22 0.19 2777000 26726314 30045000 0.38 0.62 1057872 1018114 11445365
1980 0.49 0.18 0.32 3073000 30710007 32045000 0.36 0.64 1114286 1113561 11619690
1981 0.59 0.14 0.28 3168000 20713809 31777000 0.41 0.59 1290475 8437706 12944264
1982 0.47 0.15 0.37 2300000 17193716 30055000 0.54 0.46 1247984 9329339 16307894
1983 0.38 0.15 0.47 1817000 17189425 29340000 0.71 0.29 1298934 1228835 20974534
1984 0.45 0.17 0.38 2408000 20181638 28534000 0.74 0.26 1773336 1486246 21013442
1985 0.52 0.19 0.29 2868000 20998533 28501000 0.78 0.22 2230140 1632833 22162214
Year xdg xgg xlg po pg ro rg yo yg
1961 591798 5935786 18271457 14.84 0.0040 993445.7 1362664000 7658.7 86267000
1962 570780 5441218.7 17211678 14.32 0.0041 1009471 1376973000 16025.5 14309000
1963 455959 4416009 13046910 15.89 0.0044 1038411 1426354000 28939.7 49381000
1964 427467 4925935.4 14559853 16.11 0.0046 1075038 1446569000 36626.6 20215000
1965 383622 3322019.2 12700912 16.16 0.0053 1142022 1489542000 66984.2 42973000
1966 349448 5571521.6 11881890 16.20 0.0053 1188682 1500736000 46660.4 11194000
1967 238349 4568608.5 7808707 16.09 0.0053 1223536 1567167000 34853.9 66431000
1968 401057 4482762.9 9019627 16.22 0.0053 1241217 1592097000 17680.7 24930000
1969 435720 4444575.5 9187720 16.11 0.0057 1252434 1642887000 11217.6 50790000
1970 822737 7939112 17555727 16.32 0.0057 1255768 1665997000 3333.7 23110000
1971 652967 4982001.5 15571452 17.90 0.0057 1264111 1688370000 8343.4 22373000
1972 987504 6656675.9 22349532 17.92 0.0058 1267083 1745684000 2971.1 57314000
1973 1124944 6036652.1 22028668 21.89 0.0065 1278316 1789105000 11233.6 43421000
1974 1178759 9577070.7 23403913 36.72 0.0108 1282169 1839146000 3852.5 50041000
1975 1122606 7484796.1 23737950 45.79 0.0226 1283513 1861670000 1344.4 22524000
1976 1624768 11091952 25390528 53.38 0.0363 1289068 1909639000 5555.1 47969000
1977 1478077 14931240 23039276 64.11 0.0464 1298983 1974578000 9914.5 64939000
1978 1616491 20188263 18267048 76.60 0.0551 1327888 2017695000 28905.7 43117000
1979 1719128 16545172 18599635 86.18 0.0639 1347855 2047146000 19966.5 29451000
1980 1958714 19574393 20425310 109.48 0.0887 1360041 2069674000 12185.7 22528000
1981 1877525 12276102 18832736 131.70 0.0932 1369042 2082050000 9001.5 12376000
1982 1052016 7864376.3 13747106 170.35 0.1018 1390142 2084942000 21100.1 2892000
1983 518066 4901075.6 8365466 195.72 0.1039 1413701 2087883000 23559.1 2941000
1984 634664 5319169.2 7520558 194.72 0.1071 1428959 2089942000 15257.7 2059000
1985 637860 4670194.1 6338786 214.22 0.1012 1430325 2090336000 1365.6 394000
Source: Various (see page 46).
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Notes for Table A1.5 and Table A1.6:
S sd = The share of drilling input of the total inputs,
indicate by the ratio of drilling expenditure of the
total exploration expenditures.
S sg = The share of geophysics input of the total inputs,
indicate by the ratio of geophysics expenditure of the
total exploration expenditures.
S sl = The share of land input of the total inputs,
indicate by the ratio of land expenditure of the total
exploration expenditures.
S drill = Total meters of wells drilled yearly.
S geo = Total man-hours of geophysicists work yearly.
S land = Total hectares of land under exloration.
S oil intent = Oil success rate by exploratory oil wells,
where the oil success rate is the ratio of successful
oil wells under exploration (including the ‘both oil
and gas finding’ category) over total wells drilled
during the year.
S gas intent = Gas success rate by exploratory gas wells,
where the gas success rate is the ratio of successful
gas wells under exploration over total wells drilled
during the year.
S xdo = Total meters of wells drilled by oil intent.
S xgo = Total man-hours of geophysics by oil intent.
S xlo = Total hectares of land acquisition by oil intent.
S xdg = Total meters of wells drilled by gas intent.
S xgg = Total man-hours of geophysics by gas intent.
S xlg = Total hectares of land acquisition by gas intent.
S po = Average wellhead price of all types of crude oil,
yielded by dividing the total value of crude oil
production over the total crude oil production.
S pg = Average wellhead price of gas, yielded by dividing
the total value of gas production over the total gas
production.
S ro = Cumulative oil discoveries, initial recoverable
reserves - yearly aggregate.
S rg = Cumulative gas discoveries, initial recoverable
reserves - yearly aggregate.
S yo = Oil discoveries, estimated by initial recoverable
reserves per discovery year.
S yg = Gas discoveries, estimated by initial recoverable
reserves per discovery year.
